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Letter dated 12 January 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2136 (2014), I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In this connection, I would appreciate it if the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Dina **Kawar**
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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Letter dated 26 November 2014 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit the final report of the Group, prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2136 (2014).

(*Signed*) Daniel **Fahey**
Coordinator

(*Signed*) Victry **Anya**

(*Signed*) Frans **Barnard**

(*Signed*) Zobel **Behalal**

(*Signed*) Gora **Mbaye**

(*Signed*) Emilie **Serralta**

Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Summary

The momentum created by the defeat of the Movement of 23 March in November 2013 failed to translate into significant gains in security and stability in 2014 in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. A military operation against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) significantly weakened, but did not defeat the sanctioned armed group. An expected military operation against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) did not materialize and, as of the end of November 2014, efforts to negotiate the disarmament of this sanctioned armed group have failed to produce meaningful results. In addition, numerous Congolese and foreign armed groups contributed to instability in Orientale, North Kivu, South Kivu and Katanga provinces.

ADF, FDLR, Nduma Defence for Congo (led by sanctioned individual Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi) and other armed groups continued to recruit, train and use child soldiers in 2014. Armed groups also committed a variety of other abuses, including torture, enslavement and sexual violence. There were mass killings in June in Mutarule (South Kivu) and in October and November in Beni territory (North Kivu).

While there has been progress on traceability and due diligence efforts concerning minerals produced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, smuggling continues. In addition, elements of the Congolese army (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, FARDC) and some armed groups remain involved in the minerals trade, potentially introducing conflict minerals into supply chains in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbouring States. There was virtually no progress in addressing gold smuggling in 2014 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, and scant evidence of interest in traceability and due diligence by those Governments or by the Government of the United Arab Emirates. The illegal exploitation of and trade in wildlife products, including ivory, remains a serious problem involving armed groups, elements of the Congolese army, local poachers, and armed bands from South Sudan. FDLR and elements of the army remain involved in the production of and trade in charcoal and wood in North Kivu.

The Government of Burundi failed to notify the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo about the deployment of the Burundian army (Force de défense nationale, FDN) in South Kivu. Although this deployment ended in October, there were instances of sexual violence committed by the Burundian army and/or the Imbonerakure youth group during the deployment. Evidence also emerged of failure to notify the Committee about a 2012 delivery of ammunition from China to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The diversion of arms and ammunition from the Congolese army to armed groups continued in 2014 and is indicative of broader problems faced by the Democratic Republic of the Congo in terms of stockpile management.

I. Introduction

1. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2136 (2014), the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted, on 26 November 2014, its final report to the Council, through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In accordance with the request made by the Council in paragraph 27 of resolution 2136 (2014), the Group cooperated with the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire on natural resources, with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group with respect to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and with other groups and panels as noted in the present report.

Standards of evidence

2. The Group used the evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997, annex). The Group based its findings on documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. When this was not possible, the Group corroborated information by using at least three independent and reliable sources.

3. Given the nature of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are few documents that provide definitive proof of arms transfers, recruitment, command responsibility for grave human rights abuses and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The Group has therefore relied on eyewitness testimony from members of local communities, ex-combatants and current members of armed groups. The Group has also considered expert testimony by government officials and military officers from the Great Lakes region and United Nations sources. The Group met with government officials, private sector actors and organizations in 11 countries (see annex 1). The Group sent 143 requests for information to Governments and companies, and received varying levels of compliance with its requests (see annex 2).

II. Foreign armed groups

A. Allied Democratic Forces

4. In January 2014, the Congolese army (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, FARDC) launched Operation Sukola I against ADF. With minimal support from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the army dislodged ADF from its known bases in the forest north-east of Beni, North Kivu, and killed hundreds of soldiers[1] and ADF dependants; hundreds of ADF elements also surrendered, were captured or were rescued. Despite battlefield defeats in the first half of 2014, nearly all ADF leaders are alive or unaccounted for. ADF leader and sanctioned individual Jamil Mukulu disappeared in April with approximately 20 senior leaders (see annex 3), while

[1] The ADF military does not have ranks; people are either "soldiers" or "commanders". In this section, the Group uses those terms, or the terms "combatant" or "ex-combatant.".

his second in command, Seka Baluku,[2] is in charge of several smaller ADF groups that include other important ADF commanders (see annex 4).

5. The Group believes that ADF still has the potential to regroup and rebuild, as it did following similar operations in 2005 and 2010 (see annex 5 and S/2014/428, para. 7). Since ADF commanders are not typically involved in combat operations, most have survived the battles of 2014. In addition, ADF recruitment, support and finance networks have not been significantly affected.

6. The information in this section is derived from the Group's interviews with 42 ex-ADF members, of whom 27 were ex-combatants, 11 were civilians and 4 were *bazana* (see annex 6). *Bazana*, a Luganda word meaning "slaves captured during war", describes people abducted and enslaved by ADF; the singular form is *muzana* (see annex 7). The Group also interviewed two people recruited in 2014 who were arrested before joining ADF. The Group visited ADF camps on three occasions in April and May 2014 and analysed hundreds of pages of ADF documents recovered by the Group and the Congolese army (see S/2014/428, paras. 29-34). The Group acquired additional information from local sources in Beni and Oicha, Congolese army officers, MONUSCO staff and government officials in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Group also consulted the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004).

No links to foreign terrorist groups

7. The Group did not find credible evidence suggesting that ADF has, or recently has had, links to foreign terrorist groups, including to Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. Ten ex-combatants, eight of whom had been in ADF for 2-6 years and a *muzana* told the Group they knew of no such links. The Group also consulted the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group and Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, both of which reported no evidence of links between Al-Shabaab or Al-Qaida and ADF. In November, a senior intelligence official of the Congolese army told the Group that the army had no evidence of any links between ADF and foreign terrorist groups.

Allied Democratic Forces split into two main groups

8. On 16 January 2014, the Congolese army launched Operation Sukola I against ADF. Advancing on several fronts, the army moved deep into ADF territory and pushed it out of many of its forest camps (see annex 8), sustaining and inflicting many casualties in the process (see S/2014/428, paras. 8-16). Early in April, as the Congolese army was approaching Madina, the site of the main camp and last stronghold of ADF, ADF split into two groups.

[2] ADF members often had at least two names, a "real" name and a bush name, and many also had numerous nicknames. The Group obtained numerous different spellings for ADF members during interviews and from analysing documents recovered at the ADF Madina camp (see annexes 3 and 4).

Mukulu group

9. One group, led by ADF leader and sanctioned individual Jamil Mukulu, left the Madina camp at night, a few days before the Congolese army took over on 16 and 17 April. Mukulu departed with approximately 30 people, including some 17 senior ADF leaders and most of his family (see annex 3). Among those in the Mukulu group were Richard Muzei (Mukulu's son), Bisasso (chief of finance), Kikutte (a deputy army commander), Magezi Abdul (deputy of internal security, see annex 9), Benjamin Kisokeranyo (senior adviser to Mukulu) and several other long-term ADF commanders and members of the ADF society of elite leaders called "the 8,000" or *Kanana* (see annex 10).

10. As of late November, the whereabouts of Mukulu and approximately 30 senior leaders and family members who left with him remain unknown. Based on testimonies from ADF ex-combatants, dependants and *bazana*, as well as sources in Beni, the Group believes that the Mukulu group remains in North Kivu, somewhere between the ADF former strongholds north-east of Beni town and the town of Butembo.

Baluku group

11. After the departure of the Mukulu group, Seka Baluku was in command of the remaining ADF. Baluku immediately began to evacuate the Madina camp, which at that time contained approximately 1,000-1,200 people. The Baluku group initially moved to camp AKBG (see annex 8), approximately 2 km north of the Madina camp (see S/2014/428, annex 3). The evacuation from Madina lasted several days, after which Baluku led everyone out of camp AKBG and deeper into the forest. There was no decisive battle for the Madina camp; the few dozen ADF defenders left behind withdrew when the Congolese army began its assault.

12. Many senior ADF leaders remained with the Baluku group (see annex 4), including Hood Lukwago (army commander), Kalume (a deputy army commander), Nasser (chief of combat operations), Recoilance (chief of internal security), Muzzanganda (armorer), Adam (assistant armorer), Fezza (senior commander), Werason (training instructor), Rafiki (training instructor) and Mwanje (deputy chief of finance).

13. In May and June, the Congolese army pursued Baluku's ADF group deeper into the forest. The army repeatedly engaged ADF soldiers, who usually deployed away from the main group, although ex-combatants and a *muzana* told the Group that a surprise attack by the army in May killed dozens of ADF soldiers and civilians. By mid-June, Baluku's group was growing weaker and smaller. In addition to losing people in combat, the group saw some of its members escape owing to the fact that ADF was in almost constant movement.[3] The Baluku group was also out of reach of food supplies and deliveries from the ADF network. ADF ex-combatants, dependants and *bazana* told the Group that ADF experienced a period of famine that started in late June and lasted into August. During that period, the Group estimates that at least 200 people, most of them children, starved to death.[4] By late July, ADF was abandoning children, women

[3] Several sources estimate that between 200 and 300 people escaped from ADF in 2014. The Congolese army found some of these people and brought them to Beni. Other escapees, particularly Congolese from the Beni area, returned home on their own.

[4] ADF ex-combatants, civilians and *bazana* told the Group that between 3 and 10 people (mainly children) died each day during the famine. Given that the period lasted approximately six weeks, it is estimated that between 126 and 420 people died. The Group considers 200 to be a conservative estimate.

and men in the forest who were too weak or sick to walk. Congolese soldiers found some of these abandoned people and MONUSCO transported several of them out of the forest to hospitals in Beni and Goma.

14. During the famine, Seka Baluku split his group into at least three smaller groups and moved them closer to the Beni-Oicha-Eringeti axis. By late August, these groups resumed looting food from farms and villages and kidnapped local people along that axis. ADF members who escaped or were captured told the Group that ADF received deliveries of food and other supplies at night by "taxi men" on motorcycles; ADF commanders also sent soldiers in civilian attire to Oicha to purchase supplies. These same sources told the Group that ADF had been reduced to approximately 150-200 people overall, approximately 30 of whom were soldiers and 30-40 of whom were commanders who did not fight; the remainder were women and children. ADF soldiers lacked arms and ammunition and were not resupplied from external sources.

Networks

15. ADF has well-organized recruitment, support and finance networks that have been key to its survival and re-emergence following the military operations of 2005 and 2010. The networks extend from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (particularly Oicha, Beni, Butembo, Goma, Bukavu and Uvira) eastward through Uganda and Rwanda, and internationally to the United Kingdom. As of late November, these networks remained largely intact.

Recruitment

16. ADF has an extensive recruitment network in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda through which it persuades and deceives people to voluntarily join its forces (see S/2012/843, para. 108, and S/2013/433, para. 92). Despite the military operations against it, this recruitment network continued to function in 2014, even after ADF left the Madina camp. The Group interviewed 10 people recruited in 2014; of these, three were recruited in June, one in July and one in August.

17. According to ADF ex-combatants, dependants and *bazana*, most ADF members are Ugandans, with Congolese being the second most-represented nationality. ADF ranks also include small numbers of nationals of Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania. Two people said that there was one Somali man in ADF, but added that he had grown up in Kenya and had later lived in Uganda before joining the group.

18. Two ex-combatants, one ADF civilian and one *muzana* told the Group that in 2013 several people of Ugandan origin living in London had joined ADF. Among them was a man called Abbas Sekamate, who had brought two or three of his sons and one daughter to ADF. Sekamate had undergone military training and become a soldier. The same sources told the Group that Sekamate was killed in combat in June or July 2014.

19. According to ADF ex-combatants and civilians, ADF appeals to Muslims to join the group voluntarily in one of three ways. One method involves having people within ADF persuade their relatives to come to the bush, usually through phone calls or letters; seven ex-ADF members told the Group that they had family members in ADF when they were recruited. A second recruitment technique involves ADF members, including those in the group's external network, appealing directly to individuals and families

with no prior ties to ADF. A third approach involves the use of Muslim clerics to recruit individuals or families at mosques or Muslim schools.

20. ADF also pursues involuntary recruitment in three ways. It kidnaps people, usually non-Muslim civilians living or working on the periphery of ADF-held territory, and forces them to live as *bazana* in ADF camps or become soldiers (see para. 133). ADF also lures people through false promises of free education, including promises of opportunities to study abroad. A third way is to promise lucrative employment and/or business opportunities. Although most adult male ex-combatants told the Group that they had been deceived into joining ADF by a job offer, one ex-combatant, one MONUSCO staff member and a local source in Beni told the Group that many men joined ADF voluntarily. According to ADF dependants interviewed by the Group, married men often brought their families, who were not aware that they were joining an armed group.

21. Twenty-two Ugandan ex-combatants interviewed by the Group identified 18 different men as having contacted them initially. Those 22 recruits were in 12 different districts in Uganda and 20 of them passed through Kampala on their way to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 11). Two ADF ex-combatants and one dependant (a child) identified a man named Kusha Dada as a recruiter for ADF, but no other recruiter was mentioned more than twice. In some cases, the person who made initial contact transported the recruit all the way to ADF, but in other cases the recruit was handed over to another person, usually in Kampala, and/or other people in towns further along ADF human transit routes.[5]

22. According to ex-combatants interviewed by the Group, the most common human transit route from Uganda went from Kampala, through the western Ugandan town of Kasese, across the border at Bwera-Kasindi, to Beni (see annex 11). A second route took people from Kampala through south-western Uganda and Rwanda to Goma, from where they were transported northward through Butembo and Beni. In Beni, recruits were moved at night, usually on motorcycles but also in cars, to designated locations, usually along the road between Mbau and Kamango. At those meeting points (see para. 30), armed ADF soldiers took the recruits into the forest to ADF camps. A third transit route, less common than the first two, went from Kampala, through Fort Portal and Bundibugyo, across the border to Nobili and Kamango, from where people were taken into the bush.

23. Of the three Congolese ADF ex-combatants interviewed by the Group, one person from Bukavu accepted a false promise of education in Canada, one was recruited in Butembo and one was kidnapped near Mbau. The Group also interviewed one woman whose husband was recruited in Uvira (and took his family with him) and a girl who was recruited in Goma through false pretences. In some cases, ADF recruiters accompanied the Congolese recruits; in other cases, recruits made the trip to Beni on their own. With the exception of the person kidnapped near Mbau, the Congolese recruits travelled from Beni to ADF camps in the same manner as Ugandan recruits (see para. 22).

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[5] The transport of people recruited through the "threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability" meets the definition of human trafficking under article 3 (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Since some recruits joined ADF voluntarily, however, the term does not apply to the movement of all recruits. Nonetheless, it is clear that ADF has engaged in human trafficking.

24. Once in ADF camps, male recruits underwent military training, typically at camp Commander Ibrahim Battle Group (CIBG). Four ex-combatants told the Group they were forced to undergo military training and had been imprisoned for initially refusing to be trained. Sixteen ex-combatants identified Rafiki as their trainer, while nine identified Werason (who was also commander at camp CIBG), seven identified Udongo and four identified Kalume as military instructors. ADF continued to train new recruits after April 2014, while it was on the move.

Material support

25. ADF has sustained itself in the forest with help from a material support network in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Rwanda. In addition to purchasing and delivering supplies to ADF in the bush, members of this network facilitate the transit of recruits and the movement of ADF cadres. Ex-combatants report that ADF rarely received arms and ammunition through its network; most arms and ammunition were taken during operations against the Congolese army.

26. For the past several years and at least until April 2014, ADF received regular deliveries of food, fuel, medicine, clothes, money and various consumer goods. Documents obtained by the Congolese army in April 2014 show that deliveries were made to the camp at Madina several times a week in 2012 and 2013 (see annex 12). Ex-combatants interviewed by the Group also confirmed that regular deliveries of people and goods were made prior to and during the early stages of Operation Sukola, in 2014.

27. Benjamin Kisokeranyo, a close adviser to Jamil Mukulu (see annex 3 and S/2013/433, para. 96), developed the shopping lists that ADF agents used to purchase goods in Eringeti, Oicha, Beni and, especially, Butembo. Although ADF maintained fruit and vegetable gardens near its camps (see S/2014/428, annex 8) and looted food from local communities, it required the regular delivery of salt, beans, rice, sugar and other food items to sustain a total population of 1,500-2,000 people.

28. The Group has identified several people working outside ADF camps in the material support network as a result of interviews with ADF ex-combatants and dependants, a local source in Beni and documents recovered by the Congolese army in April 2014 at the Madina camp. One of the key ADF agents in the Beni-Butembo area is "Okapi", who was identified by two ex-combatants, an ADF dependant, a *muzana*, two sources in Beni and documents recovered at the Madina camp (see annex 12). Congolese authorities arrested Okapi in August 2014, but released him in September for reasons that remain unclear; local sources in Beni believe he has joined ADF in the bush.

29. Another important agent is Shengazi Yalala (also known as Shenga Yalala), who left the Madina camp in April. According to an ADF ex-combatant, a civilian, a *muzana* and two local sources in Beni, Yalala is a key operative and very close to Jamil Mukulu. Four sources identified a man named Saidi as an agent who brought recruits and supplies to ADF camps. Three sources identified a man called Kaberebere as a member of the ADF support network; a document recovered at the Madina camp identified him as a contact in Beni (see annex 12). The Group also interviewed a man who acknowledged driving supplies and recruits from Butembo to Beni and to meeting points.

30. ADF operatives deliver supplies at night to meeting points along the Mbau-Oicha and Mbau-Kamango axes. Several motorcycles or a single vehicle are usually used to

deliver the goods at the pre-arranged meeting point, where several men waiting by the side of the road quickly offload the goods. ADF usually has additional porters (under armed guard) waiting nearby to carry the goods back to camp. The documents recovered by the Congolese army at the Madina camp identify the commander and the porters by name, and the supplies and money they carried to the camp (see annex 12).

31. After ADF left Madina in April 2014 and retreated deeper into the forest, its deliveries became less frequent and were reduced to a few food items and batteries. Ex-combatants told the Group that, between late June and mid-August, when the main ADF group was deep in the forest, deliveries were made only about once a week.

32. When the groups under the control of Seka Baluku returned to the Mbau-Oicha-Eringeti axis in late August, ADF was able to steal food and kidnap people, as well as to receive deliveries of supplies. Two ADF dependants, one ex-combatant and a local source in Beni told the Group that, starting in August, ADF commander Eria (see annexes 3 and 4) also used the ADF network to exfiltrate wives and children of important ADF commanders to Beni, where they stayed before going to Goma. Among these women were the wives of Nasser (chief of combat operations) and Richard Muzei (Jamil Mukulu's son).

Financial support

33. ADF has a financial support network that includes local and international sources. In 2014, the Group documented that ADF received financing through international money transfers, the theft of Congolese army salaries and the delivery of funds to camps by recruits and ADF agents. The Group also received credible information that ADF derived funding from harvesting timber in its area of control (see also S/2011/738, paras. 57-58, and S/2012/843, para. 107). The Group did not find evidence that ADF was engaged in gold mining in 2014, as had been reported in prior reports (see S/2011/738, para. 59, and S/2012/843, para. 107).

34. The information in this section is based on documents recovered in April 2014 from the Madina camp; interviews with ADF ex-combatants, civilians and *hazana*; information from local sources in Beni; money transfer records from Western Union; and consultations with officials of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Kingdom.

35. Based on documents recovered in April 2014 by the Congolese army in the Madina camp and subsequent investigations, the Group is of the view that Aisha Namutebi, a naturalized United Kingdom citizen of Ugandan origin living in London sent money to two ADF agents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In April 2013, Ms. Namutebi transferred $1,500 to Estha Furaha Bulabula, who received the money in Goma (see annex 13). Three sources in Beni told the Group that Ms. Bulabula was part of the ADF network in Goma. The documents from the Madina camp indicate that Ms. Bulabula received an additional $4,040 from unknown sources in late March and early April 2013; she also disbursed $3,600 to several people and sent $200 to someone through Western Union (see annex 14).

36. Ms. Namutebi also sent money to Yusufu Shabani Majuto, identified by three sources in Beni as an ADF operative. Data provided to the Group by Western Union shows that, between June 2013 and June 2014, people using 17 names made 21 money transfers to Mr. Shabani from 11 different locations in London, totalling $13,471 (see annex 13). In response to an inquiry from the Group, the Home Office of the United

Kingdom stated that it was unable to identify any of the 17 names used to send this money on the basis of the biodata available. The Group has identified dozens of additional money transfers from people using these 17 names to individuals in Goma, Butembo, Beni and Bunia, but has been unable to confirm that the recipients are known or suspected ADF agents.

37. In 2014, ADF also stole money from the Congolese army that was intended to pay soldiers' salaries. On 30 or 31 May, an ADF ambush near Eringeti against soldiers led ADF to capture a backpack full of money. Three ex-combatants, including one soldier involved in the ambush, as well as local sources in Beni, told the Group that the backpack contained approximately $80,000.[6] ADF commander Amigo, who led the ambush, gave the money to Seka Baluku, who gave a cash bonus to the soldiers involved in the raid.

38. Prior to evacuating the Madina camp, ADF regularly received money at meeting points and from newcomers. In some cases, the amounts were relatively small, but in other cases the sums were in excess of $1,000 (see annex 12).

Improvised explosive devices

39. The Group interviewed ex-combatants who stated that ADF commanders made improvised explosive devices in the Madina camp starting in late 2013 (see S/2014/428, para. 20). Five ex-combatants identified Muzzanganda, the ADF armorer, as the primary maker of such devices, and four ex-combatants identified Adam as assisting him in this effort; both ADF commanders are believed to still be alive as of late November (see annex 4). ADF called its improvised explosive devices *wataku* or *chijulo* (meaning "meal") because they were typically made using a pot or saucepan.

40. The Group maintains the view, already expressed in its midterm report, that ADF improvised explosive devices are of a low level of sophistication (see S/2014/428, para. 23) and show no evidence of knowledge transfer from foreign terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida or Al-Shabaab. The Group had samples of explosive found in one improvised explosive device tested at a certified laboratory, which determined that the samples were consistent with commercially produced slurry containing ammonium nitrate and other chemicals (see annex 15).

Attacks carried out in the Beni area in October and November

41. In October and November 2014, a series of attacks took place in the Beni area that killed more than 200 people and displaced several thousand people. The Group investigated those killings by carrying out fieldwork in late October in Beni and by conducting interviews with wounded survivors in Goma in October and with ADF ex-combatants and senior officials of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Kinshasa in November. Although the attacks were widely attributed to ADF, the Group believes that it is likely that ADF carried out certain attacks but that other armed actors also committed acts of violence, particularly in and close to Beni town.

42. In separate interviews, the Group spoke with four injured survivors of four different attacks, none of whom was certain of the identity of the attackers. One person said the attackers spoke Lingala, one said Luganda, one said Swahili and one said a mix of Luganda and Swahili; other sources in Beni told the Group that in some cases

[6] Sources, including ex-combatants, gave varying figures for the money taken in the raid, ranging from $50,000 to $120,000. The money was in Congolese francs, but sources gave the Group figures in dollars.

attackers spoke Kinyarwanda. In November, the Group interviewed separately three ADF ex-combatants in Kinshasa, who said they normally spoke Luganda during attacks, and sometimes Kiswahili, but never Lingala or Kinyarwanda, which were not used in a group dominated by Ugandans.

43. Some of the October attacks involved the killing of children, but this is not characteristic of ADF. Throughout its investigations in 2014, the Group has not documented the intentional killing of children by ADF during attacks; ADF ex-combatants also told the Group that ADF kidnaps children but does not intentionally kill them. As of late November, those responsible for the October killings remained unidentified. Early in November, however, Congolese authorities arrested approximately 200 people, including many Muslims, for alleged connections to ADF. Around that time, two senior Congolese intelligence officials told the Group that ADF may have carried out some attacks, but added that the Mai Mai and other armed elements were responsible for other killings.

44. On 18 and 20 October, two civil society groups in Beni issued statements criticizing MONUSCO and the Congolese army for failing to protect local populations. A MONUSCO official who met with several civil society groups in mid-to-late October told the Group that these groups were uniformly critical of MONUSCO and even believed that MONUSCO soldiers bore responsibility for some attacks. On 22 October, people from Oicha and Mbau broke through the main gate of the MONUSCO base at Mavivi, north of Beni town, causing minor damage. There were several additional minor attacks by the local population against MONUSCO in November in Beni and Butembo. On 19 November, unknown assailants ambushed a MONUSCO patrol near Beni.

45. The Group is concerned that, as of late November, there is still a lack of independent and critical analysis of ADF and the causes of violence in the Beni area (see S/2014/428, para. 39).

B. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

46. Since the Group's midterm report (see S/2014/428, para. 41), the leadership of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)[7] has failed to demonstrate a genuine and sustained commitment to the disarmament process, thereby exacerbating divisions among senior FDLR commanders and straining the group's international political alliances.

47. As of November 2014, two key challenges remain before the FDLR situation can be resolved. The first is the lack of progress on the disarmament and relocation of the estimated 1,500 FDLR combatants, which makes it highly likely that FDLR will be unable to meet the deadline of 2 January 2015 established by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region of Africa (ICGLR) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for the armed group's complete disarmament and surrender. This would theoretically trigger military action by MONUSCO and the Congolese army; however, FDLR may be able to avoid being attacked if the deadline is extended again, or if MONUSCO and the army are too preoccupied with the situation in Beni territory to take action against FDLR.

[7] The Group is referring here to FDLR-Forces combattantes Abacunguzi.

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48. The second challenge is the presence of civilians, most of them Rwandan refugees whom FDLR claims to be defending, in close proximity to FDLR combatants. A military operation by MONUSCO and the Congolese army could result in civilian deaths and trigger large-scale displacement, as happened in 2009 during Operation Kimia II (see S/2009/603, para. 16). According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, using government figures, as of January 2014 there were 185,003 Rwandan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Failure to disarm and surrender

49. The FDLR leadership's lack of commitment to disarming and surrendering within the six-month time frame is demonstrated by the failure to adhere to the calendar established on 4 August by ICGLR, SADC, MONUSCO and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 16). In addition, FDLR sent a small number of combatants to transit camps, releasing mainly older combatants in South Kivu, and surrendered a small quantity of weapons that were of poor quality.

50. In May and June 2014, FDLR leaders allowed 253 combatants to relocate to transit camps, claiming this was a demonstration of their intent to disarm and surrender.[8] On 30 May, 102 combatants came forward in Buleusa, North Kivu, and were moved by MONUSCO to a transit camp in Kanyabayonga. On 9 June, 83 combatants arrived at Kigogo, South Kivu, and were transported to a MONUSCO camp in Walungu.[9] On 29 June, an additional 68 combatants came forward in South Kivu;[10] however, because FDLR leadership did not allow people in Walungu to move to Kisangani, as planned, the combatants and their dependants could not join the MONUSCO camp and remained in the village of Karhala (see annex 17). The 253 combatants represent approximately 17 per cent of the estimated 1,500 FDLR combatants, according to MONUSCO and past estimates by the Group (see S/2014/42, para. 90). Of the combatants who came forward, the highest-ranking were majors.

51. According to data on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement available to the Group at the Walungu camp, many of the combatants were over 40 years old and among them were a blind man and a man with only one arm. In August 2014, two former FDLR combatants from South Kivu told the Group that they thought FDLR commanders had sent older and non-essential combatants for disarmament in order to prolong the disarmament process; a MONUSCO staff member also expressed this view to the Group. In addition, during the Group's visit to Walungu, FDLR combatants told the Group they were part of the "leopard battalion" despite the fact that battalion structures no longer exist within FDLR.

52. The Group inspected weapons and ammunition surrendered by FDLR on 30 May and 9 June. In Mwenga, South Kivu, FDLR turned in 75 small arms (including 56 AK-47s), eight light weapons (including anti-tank weapons), hand grenades and mortars. In the Group's assessment, most of the weapons were not in working order and would require a skilled armorer to make them serviceable (see annex 18); a MONUSCO verification team shared this view. FDLR also surrendered only 200 rounds of ammunition, of which 143 were 7.62 x 39 mm, and 57 were 7.62 x 54 mm. This means that FDLR handed in only 2-3 bullets with each of the 56 AK-47s. The Group

[8] There are differences in the numbers of combatants who came forward. The Group here presents figures provided by MONUSCO.

[9] As of mid-September, there are 489 dependants in both camps.

[10] This number was provided to the Group by FDLR. The combatants were accompanied by 187 dependants.

undertook a tracing exercise for some of the weapons and ammunition collected (see para. 153).

53. In North Kivu, the condition and serviceability of weapons was also uniformly poor (see annex 18). Ammunition was not available for inspection because it had been combined with other recovered ammunition. The Group believes the low quantity and poor quality of weapons surrendered by FDLR in North and South Kivu demonstrates that the armed group either has poor quality weapons and lacks ammunition, or its elements surrendered weapons that FDLR wanted to dispose of while retaining better quality weapons and ammunition stocks.

54. As of mid-November, FDLR leaders had not allowed combatants and dependants to be relocated out of the Kivus to Kisangani, as had been decided by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo earlier in 2014.[11] This is reminiscent of the FDLR refusal in 2011 to agree to plans for disarmament and relocation to Maniema Province (see S/2011/738, paras. 98 and 100-103) and demonstrates that FDLR leadership exercises command-and-control authority over the people in Kanyabayonga, Walungu and Karhala. On 15 November, an FDLR delegation visited Kisangani and, on 26 November, FDLR leadership allowed some combatants and dependants in the camps to move to Kisangani.

55. The Group notes that in 2014 fewer combatants deserted FDLR to participate in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement process. According to MONUSCO, as of mid-September, 155 FDLR and 79 dependants had been repatriated, a number substantially lower than in 2013 (see S/2014/42, para. 94). In the absence of military pressure and in the context of the current process, combatants could be adopting a wait-and-see strategy and assessing whether they can return to Rwanda as a group, according to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement officers and an independent observer.

Divisions in the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

56. The Group has previously noted the divisions within FDLR leadership, which are linked to strategic and generational differences (see S/2014/42, para. 92, S/2013/433, para. 99, and S/2011/738, paras. 74-76 and 103). The leaders with whom the international community is negotiating (principally the following sanctioned individuals: FDLR president ad interim "General" Gaston Iyamuremye and his main allies, "General" Sylvestre Mudacumura and "Colonel" Pacifique Ntawunguka) are hardliners from the older generation of FDLR who have command responsibility for a variety of war crimes (see S/2009/603, paras. 345-356, and S/2010/596, paras. 91-92).

57. These hardline leaders are controlling the release of combatants and dependants to the MONUSCO-run camps and Kisangani, and maintaining their demands for political dialogue with Rwanda. While Iyamuremye's communiqués have repeatedly stated that FDLR wants to repatriate to Rwanda as a group, and not go through the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement process, a staff member involved in that process and an independent observer told the Group that some high-ranking FDLR officers are not interested in going back to Rwanda. None of

[11] On 27 August, in a letter addressed to the new SADC chair, President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe, the FDLR president stated: "FDLR under any circumstances will not move its ex-combatants from their respective quarters to Kisangani transit sites."

Iyamuremye's communiqués make reference to FDLR leaders moving to a third country,[12] which has been discussed in diplomatic circles.

58. The Group has talked to other FDLR leaders, a Rwandan opposition politician, MONUSCO staff and independent observers, all of whom state that some younger FDLR commanders are more willing than the sanctioned leaders to negotiate their surrender. These sources also state that Iyamuremye and other hardliners intimidate and marginalize moderate leaders, in keeping with their past practice of obstructing and delaying disarmament processes (see S/2007/423, para. 56, and S/2010/596, para. 83).

Divisions among those providing political support to the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

59. As the Group noted in its midterm report, FDLR entered a coalition called Coalition des partis politiques rwandais pour le changement (CPC) in order to pressure the Government of Rwanda to negotiate (see S/2014/428, paras. 50 and 52). On 6 October 2014, CPC president Faustin Twagiramungu released a communiqué stating that those wanted for war crimes should not be in the FDLR leadership and should surrender to international justice. FDLR president ad interim Iyamuremye, who is also CPC vice-president, answered with his own communiqué condemning Twagiramungu. In late October, Twagiramungu told the Group he was dissatisfied with the FDLR hardliners who were using Rwandan refugees as a bargaining chip during negotiations over disarmament and surrender.

60. Although the Government of Rwanda has previously claimed that FDLR received material and financial support from the Rwanda National Congress (RNC), a Rwandan opposition party (see S/2011/738, paras. 115-122), the Group did not find evidence to support this claim in 2014. In contrast, FDLR supporters and RNC showed signs of division. Paulin Murayi, who in late 2013 was head of the RNC chapter in Belgium, left RNC on 14 February 2014 to set up his own party, the Rwandan Democratic Union, before CPC was created (see annex 19 and S/2014/428, para. 52). Murayi and RNC representatives argued publicly over the ownership of Radio Impala,[13] a Rwandan opposition website and online radio station that airs many interviews with FDLR leaders. On 25 March, RNC issued a communiqué stating that "Radio Impala, the website, podcasts, Facebook and other related electronic media are constantly used by either or both Aloys Manzi, Paulin Murayi or Saleh Karuranga" and that RNC has "no responsibility on the current editorial line and the content of the Radio since January 2014" (see annex 20). A senior FDLR commander and a Rwandan opposition politician told the Group that RNC is not working with FDLR.[14] The Group also notes that RNC has not joined CPC.

[12] As a sanctioned individual, Iyamuremye cannot travel without an exemption to the travel ban. In June, MONUSCO transported him to Kinshasa to participate in negotiations in Rome but the Government of Rwanda objected to a request from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for an exemption of the travel ban and, as a result, Iyamuremye was not allowed to leave the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[13] http://radioimpala.podomatic.com/.

[14] In 2014, Rwandan authorities took steps against individuals perceived to be affiliated with RNC and/or FDLR. In April, the Rwandan police arrested three individuals, including singer Kizito Mihigo, for allegedly working with RNC and FDLR.

Activities in the United Republic of Tanzania

61. The Group has documented that FDLR leaders and some of their political supporters in Europe have been meeting in the United Republic of Tanzania since at least 2013 (see S/2014/42, para. 110). According to a MONUSCO staff member, a senior FDLR commander and a Rwandan opposition politician, "Colonel" Hamada Habimana, FDLR's sector commander for South Kivu, travelled from South Kivu to the United Republic of Tanzania at the end of December 2013 (see S/2014/428, para. 43). Paulin Murayi arrived in Dar es Salaam on 31 December 2013 and returned again on 23 March 2014 (see annex 21). Twagiramungu told the Group he visited the United Republic of Tanzania in January 2014 and met with two FDLR commanders.

62. In a meeting with Tanzanian authorities on 31 October, the Group asked about these visits and meetings in the United Republic of Tanzania. The authorities replied: "There is no hosting of any rebels and our military has no communication with any rebels." The Group met with a senior FDLR commander that same day in the United Republic of Tanzania and is concerned that the Government of that country is not investigating activities by and in support of FDLR on its territory. Ahead of the issuance of the report, the Group shared with the Government some of the evidence it had obtained and asked for further details, but did not receive an answer as of late November.

63. In addition, the Group documented money transfers from the United Republic of Tanzania to a woman who the Group believes to be the wife of FDLR "Colonel" Hamada. In January and February 2014, "Marie Furaha" received $1,594 in Kampala from "Hamisi Hasani Kajembe", who sent the money from Dar es Salaam while Hamada was in the United Republic of Tanzania (see annex 22). The Government of Rwanda told the Group that Hamada's wife is named Marie and that she lives in Kampala. The phone number provided to the Group by Rwandan authorities for Marie also matches the phone number listed in data on the money transfers provided to the Group by Western Union. The Group further notes that Paulin Murayi sent money in February to Kajembe, who received it in Dar es Salaam. The Group continues to investigate money transfers to and from known and suspected FDLR agents and supporters in the United Republic of Tanzania.

Failure of diplomatic initiatives and the military option

64. As of mid-November, diplomatic efforts had failed to achieve the full disarmament and surrender of FDLR, or significant progress towards that goal. The deadline for total disarmament and surrender is 2 January 2015, with the threat of military action should FDLR not comply, but as of late November it is not clear whether the deadline will be met or whether the process will be further manipulated so as to postpone the deadline for surrender.

65. FDLR, Governments in the region and influential international actors have pursued different strategies with respect to resolving the FDLR issue. FDLR has linked disarmament and surrender to negotiations with Rwanda (see S/2010/596, para. 86) but has achieved little international support for its position. Diplomatic initiatives have encouraged FDLR to voluntarily disarm through the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement process, or face military attack, but as of late November this has not had a discernible effect on FDLR leaders.

66. The lack of a coherent international approach towards FDLR was evident in the conflicting efforts over surrender deadlines. On 26 June, at the invitation of the Community of Sant'Egidio, special envoys and representatives met with FDLR representatives in Rome in order to speed up the FDLR disarmament and surrender process. A week later, on 2 July, diplomats at a joint ICGLR-SADC ministerial meeting agreed to give FDLR six months to disarm and surrender, the deadline being 2 January 2015. In a communiqué, the participants in the meeting stated that failure to comply with the agreed time frame would have military consequences.

67. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo too has lacked a consistent strategy for addressing FDLR. Congolese authorities have repeatedly told the Group it is not their responsibility to ask Rwanda to negotiate with FDLR and that they want FDLR to leave the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government has refused to authorize military operations against FDLR, however, despite the desire of MONUSCO to do so (see S/2014/428, para. 40). The Government has also failed to address the long-standing issue of local-level collaboration between the army and FDLR (see paras. 71, 77 and 80 of the present report, as well as S/2008/773, paras. 102-113, S/2009/603, paras. 21-29, S/2014/42, para. 42, and S/2014/428, paras. 54-55).

68. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has allocated $10 million to the FDLR surrender and relocation process, but there has been little transparency in terms of how this money has been spent.[15] In 2014, Congolese authorities insisted that FDLR be moved to Irebu in Equateur Province, but this is an area with no United Nations presence, where Rwandan refugees were massacred in 1997 and is undesirable to FDLR leadership. In the light of challenges with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (see annex 23), there are concerns about the ability of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to adequately care for surrendered FDLR elements. In the case of the FDLR in Karhala (see para. 50), the Government agreed to provide such care but on 31 July FDLR "Colonel" Bonheur complained to the Group about repeated delays in receiving food or medications from the Government.

Continuing activities

Military activities

69. An FDLR letter dated 4 August 2014 addressed to the President of the Security Council stated that FDLR "have completely abandoned the armed struggle and have embarked on a road of non-armed political struggle". Nonetheless, the Group has documented the involvement of FDLR in military operations in 2014, as well as recruitment and collaboration with other armed groups and the Congolese army.

70. FDLR forces, in cooperation with the FDLR splinter group Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD) (see annex 24), fought against Nduma Defence for Congo (NDC) on several occasions in May and June and in September and October 2014. One former RUD "Captain" told the Group about FDLR and RUD collaboration in June during the fighting with NDC forces in Oninga, North Kivu. Two RUD ex-combatants and a MONUSCO source told the Group that FDLR and RUD had fought together against NDC in Bunyatenge. Two RUD ex-combatants also mentioned meetings between FDLR and RUD leadership in May 2014. According to a staff member working on

[15] In contrast, as of mid-September, MONUSCO had spent more than $1 million on various items, including transport, supplies and medical treatment for FDLR combatants and dependants in their camps.

disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement issues and a former RUD officer, FDLR and RUD have made a non-aggression pact; the two groups have not merged, however, as they disagree on grades for key commanders. FDLR also has good relations with the Mai Mai group led by "Major General" Kakule Sikula LaFontaine (see S/2014/42, para. 96).

71. In its midterm report, the Group reported that the Congolese army and FDLR continued to collaborate at the local level (see S/2014/428, paras. 54-55). Three former FDLR combatants, including a radio operator based at FDLR headquarters who was receiving messages from FDLR units, told the Group that FDLR often obtained ammunition from elements of the Congolese army.

72. According to former FDLR child soldiers and combatants, FDLR continued to recruit combatants in 2014, including children (see paras. 123-124). A former FDLR combatant based in Lemera, South Kivu, told the Group that, in February, FDLR forcibly recruited about 25 people, including children, in the villages of Kitopo and Miki, where there are many Rwandan refugees.

Economic activities

73. The Group has documented the engagement of FDLR in local-level taxation (see para. 124) and the exploitation of natural resources. FDLR combatants in North and South Kivu have told the Group that they had to give their commander a portion of the proceeds gained from looting or trade. A former FDLR radio operator told the Group he received messages from FDLR units about money sent to the headquarters in North Kivu, but the sums remain unclear.

74. As already mentioned by the Group in previous reports, FDLR continues to be involved in the production of and trade in charcoal in Virunga National Park (see S/2009/603, para. 21, and S/2010/596, paras. 89 and 255-256). On 11 January, an armed confrontation in the Park between a park patrol and an FDLR group resulted in the death of one park ranger and three FDLR elements; a fourth FDLR element was captured. The Group obtained a copy of an identification card recovered from one of the dead FDLR elements (see annex 25).

75. The Group has established that elements of FDLR and the Congolese army are engaged in the trade in charcoal and wood in Karenga, north-east of Goma, in Virunga National Park (see also S/2008/773, para. 113). The Group's assessment is based on interviews with four charcoal traders in Goma and three visits to Karenga in September 2014, when the Group interviewed six people and observed the trade in and transport of wood and charcoal.

76. FDLR has a base 15 km north-west of Karenga, from where it controls the charcoal and wood trade in the area. FDLR requires civilians in the area to make and transport charcoal and wood as part of a communal work requirement, called *salongo*. In addition, FDLR requires civilians engaged in the same businesses in the area around Karenga to pay 500 francs ($0.55) per day in order to operate.

77. The Group confirmed that the Congolese army unit based in Karenga[16] allows FDLR to trade in charcoal and wood. In addition, several sources in Karenga told the Group that Congolese army officers are also directly involved in the charcoal and wood

[16] 1st Battalion, Service Regiment, 34th military region.

trade in the Karenga area. During one of the Group's visits to Karenga, two charcoal traders identified for the Group a truck that was carrying charcoal belonging to an army officer (see annex 26); the Group observed the officer in possession of the manifest for this shipment.

78. The Group estimates that, each day, FDLR and army officers earn a combined $1,805 from the sale of charcoal in Karenga (see annex 27). This figure, based on a conservative assumption of the number of charcoal shipments made each week, suggests that army and FDLR officers in Karenga could earn in excess of $650,000 per year from charcoal alone.

79. The Group interviewed four FDLR ex-combatants and a local source in Butembo who confirmed that FDLR was involved in the gold sector (see also S/2008/773, paras. 78 and 87, S/2009/603, para. 33, and S/2014/42, para. 96).

80. In May, an FDLR ex-combatant formerly based in Bwito, North Kivu, told the Group that his commander forced people to mine gold near Oninga; he also reported that he had seen the commander sell this gold in Nyanzale. Also in May, the Group talked to another FDLR ex-combatant who said that FDLR was giving gold to the Congolese army in return for ammunition, near Mubi, in North Kivu. In October, a former FDLR child soldier also told the Group that his commanders collected gold from people in Oninga. A local source in Butembo told the Group that FDLR had been engaged in gold mining near Kasugho at the beginning of the year, but has since moved closer to Bunyatenge, where it is also mining gold. Another FDLR ex-combatant who had been based in Kibumba in South Kivu told the Group that FDLR bought gold from the mining sites in Kigogo, Lubumba and Kibumba and sold it in Mwenga market to traders from Bukavu.

81. According to three former FDLR combatants from South Kivu, FDLR cultivate marijuana (locally called *chanvre*) near Lemera, Kitoga and Burinyi. Women buy the marijuana from FDLR at $5 for 3 kg, or $3 for 1 kg, and sell it in Bukavu or Uvira.

C. Forces nationales de libération

82. The Forces nationales de libération (FNL), a Burundian armed group led by "General" Aloys Nzamapema, continued its activities in South Kivu, infiltrating into Burundi on at least three occasions in 2014. According to Burundian intelligence services and a former FNL combatant, the armed group's current strength remains at approximately 300 combatants (see S/2014/42, para. 124). Relations between FNL and its former ally FDLR remained strained in 2014 (see S/2014/42, para. 100). In 2014, elements of the Burundian army (Forces de défense nationale, FDN), were in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the consent of the Government of that country to fight FNL; however, this deployment was controversial.

Deployment of the Burundian army

83. The Group documented the failure of the Government of Burundi to notify the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo of military assistance and advice provided to the Congolese army, of the deployment of the Burundian army to the area of Kiliba, South Kivu, and of the shipment of arms and ammunition to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as required by paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1807 (2008). In

addition, the Group documented sexual violence committed by armed men in Burundian uniforms in the area of Kiliba.

84. In May and June, the Group gathered testimonies about the presence of the Burundian army in Congolese territory near Kiliba. On 12 July, the Group visited Kiliba and witnessed the presence of armed men wearing Burundian military uniforms near Kiliba town (see annex 28). A United Nations official, a Burundian army officer and an independent researcher told the Group that a battalion comprising around 400 Burundian soldiers was deployed in several locations around Kiliba. A Burundian intelligence officer acknowledged to the Group that a battalion had been deployed, but said that it was on the Burundian side of the border. A senior Congolese army official told the Group that not all of the 400 troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo belonged to the Burundian army and that some were part of the Burundian youth group Imbonerakure (see para. 88).

85. On 14 September, the Group returned to the same location and met with an officer of the Burundian army who explained that the Congolese army had agreed to the presence of Burundian soldiers in Kiliba and that the Congolese and Burundian armies conducted joint operations against FNL. He added that the Burundian troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo received ammunition sent from Burundi in Burundian army vehicles. This explanation came days after the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had denied the presence of Burundian soldiers in Congolese territory.

86. During an official visit to Burundi on 16 and 17 September 2014, the Group raised this issue with the Burundian Chief of the Defence Staff, who acknowledged that Burundi held joint operations with the Congolese army against FNL in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but had no permanent presence there. At the meeting, the Group advised officials of the Government of Burundi of the requirement to notify the Committee in accordance with resolution 1807 (2008); the Group later wrote to the Government of Burundi reiterating this message. As of late November, the Committee had received no such notification.

87. On 6 October, a Congolese delegation negotiated the withdrawal of the Burundian army, which started on 7 October. According to the Congolese army, as of mid-November there was no Burundian military presence on Congolese soil.

Imbonerakure

88. The controversy about a Burundian presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo emerged when, in April and May 2014, it was reported that a Burundian youth group affiliated with the Burundian ruling party (the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie), called Imbonerakure (meaning "those who see far"), was training in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

89. According to a diplomat, Congolese army officers, a journalist, an independent researcher and local civilians in Kiliba, the Imbonerakure trained in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2014. During that time, they wore Burundian army uniforms, making it difficult to distinguish them from Burundian soldiers. According to a Congolese army officer, an independent researcher, a journalist and a Burundian ex-combatant, the person coordinating the Imbonerakure in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was Major Kazungu, of the Burundian intelligence services. According to a former combatant, a Burundian journalist and a senior Congolese army officer, the

commander of the Imbonerakure operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was General Adolphe Nshimirimana, head of Burundi's intelligence services (see S/2009/603, paras. 87 and 149). When the Group visited the Burundian army camp in Kiliba, the commanding officer on site denied that any training of the Imbonerakure was taking place. The Group also asked about Major Kazungu and was told that he was not part of the Burundian army. Early in October and again early in November, the Group sent letters to the Burundian authorities asking them to comment on the matter but had not received an answer as of late November.

Sexual violence in Kiliba by men in Burundian uniforms

90. The Group received information from the local population in Kiliba that Burundian soldiers had raped local women. The Group interviewed separately three women and one 16-year-old girl who said they had been raped in 2014. While their stories varied on several points, all of them said that they had left town and gone to their fields to get food or firewood when several armed men in Burundian uniforms attacked them. They identified the attackers as members of the Burundian military because of their uniforms and, sometimes, because of the language they spoke. The local population told the Group that there had been other cases of rape in the area. Given that both the Burundian army and the Imbonerakure were present in the area, the Group could not determine who committed the rapes.

III. Congolese armed groups

A. Movement of 23 march

91. One year after the final defeat of Movement of 23 March (M23) by the Congolese army and the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade, the fate of M23 ex-combatants and political cadres in Rwanda and Uganda remains unclear (see S/2014/428, para. 56). The process envisioned by the Declaration of Commitments by the Movement of 23 March at the Conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue of December 2013 to repatriate M23 elements has been impeded by disagreements about how amnesty for insurrection, acts of war and political infractions should be granted, how the nationalities of M23 elements should be determined and even where planning meetings should take place. There is also considerable uncertainty about the status of M23 leaders, including sanctioned individuals Sultani Makenga, Innocent Kaina, Jean Marie Runiga, Eric Badège, Innocent Zimurinda and Baudoin Ngaruye, for whom the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued international arrest warrants in 2013.

92. As the process has dragged on, hundreds of M23 elements have left camps in Rwanda and a few have left camps in Uganda. The arrival of some M23 elements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and one case of recruitment of M23 ex-combatants have fuelled speculation about a new armed movement, but there is no credible evidence to support this claim. The Group believes that the process to resolve the fate of all M23 elements requires a renewed and vigorous commitment by all stakeholders, including the international community.

Actions to date

93. Following the adoption of an amnesty law in February 2014 (see S/2014/428, para. 67), the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo undertook missions to Uganda (May) and Rwanda (July) to meet M23 leaders and distribute amnesty request forms.[17] In accordance with the law, the Government stopped accepting amnesty requests in mid-August. In November, a senior Congolese intelligence official told the Group that the Government had granted amnesty to 559 Congolese M23 ex-combatants in Rwanda and Uganda. The official added that the Government was analysing additional requests, but would not confirm how many requests it had received.[18]

94. There are two important points of disagreement between the parties. While the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo believes that M23 elements must apply for amnesty that only government officials can approve or deny, the official position of M23 is that its elements should be granted amnesty simply by having signed the form and agreed to its conditions. Another significant point of contention is the nationality of M23 ex-combatants and cadres. The Government claims that there are many foreign nationals in M23 and is only considering amnesty applications from those it considers to be Congolese. Complicating the resolution of these problems is the fact that M23 and government representatives cannot agree on where to meet (the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Uganda) to discuss their points of disagreement.

95. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has said that it is ready for the immediate repatriation of those to whom it has granted amnesty. In the November plan for the implementation of the Declaration of Commitments (see annex 29), it is stated that amnestied ex-combatants will be moved to Kamina, Katanga Province.

96. An outstanding question remains about the status of M23 leaders excluded from the amnesty process. Senior Congolese intelligence officials have refused to tell the Group how many M23 elements have been excluded from consideration or to reveal the identities of those individuals. The Group believes the fate of these leaders, including sanctioned individuals, is receiving inadequate attention by all stakeholders, including the international community, and that this could have a negative impact on the process.

Effects of slow progress

97. The delayed outcome of the repatriation process has had several effects, including hundreds of M23 leaving cantonment sites in Rwanda and the consequent movement of M23 elements within Rwanda and to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group documented one case of recruitment of a few M23 ex-combatants in Masisi, but has not found evidence of other such mobilizations.

98. In response to a request from the Group, the Government of Rwanda stated that, as at 25 August, 320 M23 elements had escaped the Ngoma and Gisovu camps. Of that total, 280 were ex-combatants and 40 were political cadres. This represents 42 per cent of the 767 M23 elements at those camps,[19] according to the Government of Rwanda.[20]

[17] The mission to Rwanda was undertaken jointly with ICGLR, MONUSCO and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region.

[18] According to MONUSCO, 453 amnesty requests were collected in Rwanda and 1,678 in Uganda.

[19] On 26 June, the Government of Rwanda informed the Group that, in addition to the M23 ex-combatants located in Ngoma (who had fled the Democratic Republic of the Congo in March 2013), an additional 86 M23 ex-combatants (who had fled the Democratic Republic of the Congo in November 2013) had been staying at a camp in Gisovu, Karongo district, Western Province.

99. In a letter to the Group dated 25 July, the Government of Rwanda stated that the M23 elements who had left the camps had obviously escaped and were scattered within the region. The Group interviewed five of those escapees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who stated that while some who left the camps remained in Rwanda with their families or in refugee camps, others returned to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group is concerned about the high number of escapees, notably because they were unable to sign the amnesty form and are susceptible to being recruited by armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see paras. 104-105).

100. Escapees from Rwanda also told the Group that some ex-combatants (mostly high-ranking officers) had received permission to leave the camps. This was the case for sanctioned individuals Eric Badège, Innocent Zimurinda and Baudoin Ngaruye. On 11 August, during the Group's visit to Rwanda, government officials explained that the Government granted such leave because the M23 elements concerned were not imprisoned and had requested to move out of the camps for personal reasons, including to visit family members in Rwanda.

101. The Government of Uganda has informed M23 that, by the end of December 2014, all former combatants or civilians in its territory will need to request political asylum in order to legalize their presence. The Group interviewed two former M23 officers who had received permission from M23 leaders to leave Uganda to visit their families in Rwanda. One of them explained to the Group that, while the Government of Uganda allowed them to move around the country, it did not allow them to leave it.

Arrests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

102. In 2014, the well-publicized arrests of some M23 ex-combatants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo fuelled speculation about a new armed group or insurrection. To investigate these claims, the Group interviewed senior Congolese army and MONUSCO officials, various local sources in North Kivu and 11 M23 ex-combatants who had returned to the Democratic Republic of the Congo outside of any formal process and without having signed the amnesty form.

103. In July, the Group interviewed eight M23 ex-combatants who had been arrested in Masisi, North Kivu. Of the eight, five had been in M23 cantonment camps in Rwanda, two had stayed in Kigeme refugee camp in Rwanda and one had left for Uganda but was never officially registered there. One ex-combatant who had stayed in Kigeme told the Group that approximately 30 pro-Bosco Ntaganda combatants had gone to Kigeme after their defeat, in March 2013, by the Makenga M23 faction. All eight individuals told the Group they were trying to return to their communities in Masisi territory when they were arrested.

104. In August, the Group interviewed three other M23 ex-combatants who were arrested after they had joined a small militia group. On 13 August, the Raia Mutomboki group of "Colonel" Maachano Noah attacked a small militia group led by a self-proclaimed demobilized officer of the Rwanda Defence Force, Captain Alphonse Gapasi, also known as Safari Claude, and arrested eight survivors. The Group interviewed seven of these men, including the three who were affiliated with M23, who

[20] The Group notes inconsistencies in the reporting of escapes, notably in the case of "Lieutenant Colonel" Gasirimu Faustin, also known as Major Kazungu, who first appeared, according to a list dated 24 June, to have escaped Ngoma on 5 May. Faustin did not appear as an escapee, however, on an update of that list dated 25 August. The Group received information that he travelled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in July and met with former M23 combatants.

were then in Congolese army custody in Kinshasa. Gapasi told the Group he had formed the militia because he was concerned about his security.

105. The M23 ex-combatants told the Group that they had joined Gapasi's group because they feared for their personal safety after returning to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from Uganda and Rwanda. A senior Congolese government official called this group "M27", but the Group could not confirm the existence of such a group independent of Gapasi's now-defunct militia. Nonetheless, the Group believes that this case highlights the importance of an expedited programme of repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion for all eligible M23 ex-combatants and political cadres, to prevent the possibility that their vulnerability would lead them to join new or existing armed groups.

B. Mai Mai Yakutumba

106. In its 2013 final report, the Group reported on the failure by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to integrate Mai Mai Yakutumba, a predominantly ethnic Bembe armed group, into the Congolese army (see S/2014/42, annex 24), at a time when many armed groups had surrendered (see annex 23). This group, led by "General" William Amuri, also known as Yakutumba, enjoys some popular and political support for its nationalism and its hostility towards populations perceived as originating in Rwanda, but its actions destabilize large areas of southern South Kivu, northern Katanga, and Lake Tanganyika. Mai Mai Yakutumba remains a significant group not only because of the insecurity it causes, but also because it is allied with other armed groups that oppose proposed changes to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that could allow the President, Joseph Kabila, to run for a third term in office.

Structure

107. Yakutumba leads a military branch called Forces armées alléluia; Abwe Mapigano is his second in command (see S/2014/42, annex 24). The branch consists of approximately 300 soldiers and a naval force. Ekanda Dragila Saidi, also known as Baleine, a former naval officer, is the head of Yakutumba's navy. Ekanda rejoined Yakutumba in May 2014 after returning from the United Republic of Tanzania, where he had been imprisoned since 2011 (see S/2011/738, paras. 184-186). Sangana Maliamacho, a former Congolese army officer, heads Yakutumba's intelligence services. Raphael Looba Undji remains the President of Yakutumba's political party, Parti pour l'action et la reconstruction du Congo (PARC).

Military activities

108. The centrepiece of Mai Mai Yakutumba's military activities in 2014 was the re-emergence of a naval force under Ekanda's command. At its height, Ekanda's navy consisted of approximately 70 men and seven motorized pirogues. According to a Mai Mai Yakutumba intelligence officer, a close associate of Ekanda and Congolese naval officers, Ekanda's boats were equipped with at least three 12.7 mm machine guns. This force operated in a wide area on Lake Tanganyika, south of Uvira.

109. Between June and September, Ekanda's motorized pirogues attacked boats on Lake Tanganyika. According to the Uvira shipowners association, Congolese army

sources and one former combatant, Ekanda's force attacked and looted several pirogues, stealing fuel and boat engines. Ekanda's force also targeted larger boats, both to steal their cargo and levy taxes. According to an intelligence officer for Mai Mai Yakutumba, a close associate of Ekanda and a local non-governmental organization, Ekanda demanded $2 from each person travelling in the larger boats. A close associate of Ekanda told the Group that during two weeks in August, Ekanda had acquired about $170 each from four boats carrying passengers. A person close to Ekanda, a senior Congolese army officer, a MONUSCO staff member and a member of the shipowners association all reported that rapes, including by Ekanda, took place when Ekanda's force stopped boats. The Group was unable to interview the women who had been raped.

110. On 25 August and on 4 and 5 September, the Congolese army conducted operations against Ekanda's naval force, killing several combatants and destroying some boats. The Congolese naval commander in Uvira told the Group that, on 25 August, his sailors had sunk several of Ekanda's boats, two of which had been armed with 12.7 mm machine guns. Ekanda was seriously injured during those encounters and, as of late November, there were conflicting reports about whether he had succumbed to his injuries.

111. On land, Mai Mai Yakutumba experienced mixed success in 2014. On 7 April, Yakutumba's soldiers attacked the mining town of Misisi, in Fizi territory, and killed several Congolese soldiers, including officers. The army subsequently launched operations against Mai Mai Yakutumba and, on 22 June, pushed the group out of its base in the coastal town of Talama.

112. Mai Mai Yakutumba has a long-standing relationship with FNL, the Burundian armed group active in South Kivu (see para. 82, as well as S/2010/596, para. 116, and S/2011/738, para. 149). PARC officials and Congolese army sources told the Group that, in 2014, FNL and Mai Mai Yakutumba continued this collaboration. A South Kivu politician close to Yakutumba told the Group that Agathon Rwasa, the leader of FNL, assigned some of his soldiers to serve with Yakutumba. One PARC official in Fizi territory confirmed this, and told the Group that Rwasa had visited Mai Mai Yakutumba in July in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group obtained a list of nine Burundian nationals arrested by the Congolese army for allegedly working with Mai Mai Yakutumba.[21] According to a Congolese army commander, the FNL provided support to Mai Mai Yakutumba so that FNL could set up a rear base ahead of the 2015 Burundian elections, as it had in 2011 (see S/2011/738, para. 168).

113. In addition to recruiting personnel from FNL, Mai Mai Yakutumba receives ethnic Bembe recruits from the United Republic of Tanzania. Two Congolese army officers, a Mai Mai Yakutumba official in Fizi, a former intelligence officer for the armed group and a PARC official told the Group that, in 2014, Mai Mai Yakutumba recruited men in refugee camps in the United Republic of Tanzania. A senior Congolese army officer, a former intelligence officer for Mai Mai Yakutumba and a PARC official told the Group that one source of recruits is the Nyarugusu refugee camp located near Kigoma, a town on the Tanzanian shore of Lake Tanganyika.

114. Two PARC officials, one ex-combatant and a senior Congolese army officer told the Group that Mai Mai Yakutumba is in coalition with several armed groups, including the Alliance patriotique pour un Congo libre et souverain in North Kivu, Bwasakala in

[21] The Group noted that their names did not, however, appear on a list shared by the Burundian intelligence services of FNL soldiers repatriated in 2014 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Fizi territory and Raia Mutomboki in Mwenga and Shabunda (see annex 30). According to a PARC official, these armed groups plan to oppose any revision of the Constitution that would allow Mr. Kabila to run for a third term. A Mai Mai Yakutumba combatant told the Group on 30 September that he was in Goma and on his way to meet representatives of an armed group in North Kivu.

115. The Group obtained evidence that Mai Mai Yakutumba still receives support from some elements of the Congolese army (see S/2011/738, paras. 163 and 171-174). A Congolese colonel told the Group that the army was redeploying Bembe soldiers sympathetic to Mai Mai Yakutumba outside South Kivu. Nonetheless, one civilian official for Mai Mai Yakutumba and one Mai Mai Yakutumba intelligence officer told the Group that some soldiers sell and give ammunition to Yakutumba's group. The Group also obtained a copy of a letter dated 8 July from Ekanda to a Congolese army officer in Kalemie, telling him that Mai Mai Yakutumba was at war against people from Rwanda and asking him to remain vigilant for the country (see annex 31).

C. Mai Mai Morgan

116. Since the death in April of Mai Mai leader Paul Sadala, also known as Morgan, his followers have continued to commit human rights abuses and exploit natural resources in Mambasa territory, Ituri district (see S/2014/42, paras. 65 and 69). Four people who had been kidnapped by Morgan's group, two civil society officials in Mambasa territory and three state agents told the Group that there were at least three armed groups active in and around the Okapi Fauna Reserve. The remnants of Morgan's group have formed at least two new armed groups, one led by Mangaribi (Morgan's brother) and one by Manu (see S/2013/433, para. 76). A third group consists of the followers of the late Maitre Jesus. The same sources told the Group that Mangaribi exerts some influence over the other groups and has stated that his objective is to avenge Morgan's death and take control of the Reserve (see S/2013/433, para. 77). According to the same sources, since April the forces led by Magaribi, Manu and Maitre have looted gold mines, raped women and attacked the Congolese army. The Group also documented Morgan's links to army officer Colonel Michigan (see annex 32).

IV. Violations of international humanitarian and human rights law

117. In 2014, the Group documented a variety of human rights and international humanitarian law violations, including as part of the Pygmy-Luba conflict in Katanga (see annex 33).

A. Child soldiers

118. In 2014, the recruitment and use of child soldiers continued in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group focused on child soldiers in North Kivu, and interviewed 34 children, reviewed 350 case files and analysed data on 1,125 boys and girls who left armed groups in 2014. The Group conducted field visits in North Kivu to investigate the use of child soldiers by FDLR (in Rutshuru territory), NDC/Sheka (in Walikale territory), Nyatura (in Masisi territory) and ADF (in Beni territory). The

Group also collected information on child soldiers from dozens of adult ex-combatants who served in various armed groups and from internally displaced persons. The Group consulted the MONUSCO Child Protection Section, the United Nations Children's Fund, the Specialized Police for the Protection of Children and Women of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other local and international child protection partners.

119. Between January and September 2014, the North Kivu local transitory care centre for children associated with armed groups received 1,125 children between 11 and 17 years of age (143 girls and 982 boys) from 22 armed groups (see annex 34). Of those children, 464 (41 per cent) were recruited in 2014, 408 (36 per cent) in 2013 and 97 (9 per cent) in 2012 (see annex 35). Nearly all of these cases involved children recruited in the territories of Rutshuru (536, or 48 per cent) and Masisi (499, or 44 per cent) (see annex 35).

120. Of the 143 girls, 39 (27 per cent) had been used as wives for combatants, 31 (22 per cent) as soldiers and 73 (51 per cent) for cooking or manual labour. Of the 982 boys, 691 (70 per cent) said they had been used as combatants and had carried out various functions, including fighting the enemy, transporting ammunition boxes and protective amulets during combat, stealing food from farms and villages for the group, guarding bases and their unit commanders, spying on the enemy, and transmitting messages. The other 291 boys (30 per cent) said they had carried out manual labour, including farming, cooking, fetching water, washing clothes and general cleaning.

121. While most of the children received by the transitory centre had served in one armed group, 81 children had been in two or more groups (see annex 35). Of these, 35 had last been with FDLR, 25 with Nyatura and one with NDC; the rest had been with other groups. The Group analysed 18 files of children who had been rerecruited after leaving an armed group and interviewed five of those children. Information from the case files and interviews suggested that, after leaving their first armed group, many of the children had been stigmatized and threatened by their former colleagues, which led them to rejoin their old unit or to be recruited by another armed group.

122. The Group has focused on the recruitment and use of children by sanctioned entities FDLR and ADF, the NDC group under the command of sanctioned individual "General" Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, and the Nyatura group, which includes many children.

Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda

123. In 2014, FDLR recruited and used child soldiers. This is consistent with the findings contained in the Group's previous reports (see S/2012/843, para. 157, and S/2013/433, paras. 111-113), and the Secretary-General's report of 30 June 2014 on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2014/453, para. 25). Of the children who reported to the transitory centre, 332 said they had been with FDLR; of this number, 145 said they had been with FDLR-Forces combattantes Abacunguzi, 11 had been with the FDLR splinter group RUD (see annex 24, as well as S/2014/42, paras. 111-113) and six had been with the Soki group (see S/2014/42, para. 114). A further 170 said they had been with "FDLR" without specifying a particular faction. The Group hereafter uses FDLR to mean FDLR-Forces combattantes Abacunguzi.

124. Of the 145 children separated from FDLR, at least 25 were recruited in 2014. The Group interviewed five children (aged 14-16 years), two of whom were recruited in

2014, one in 2013 and two in 2010. Two boys had been trained in combat tactics for two to three months at Kazuba training camp before 2014, and mentioned that their unit commanders were involved in the illicit trade in gold, wood and charcoal and in taxing the population (see paras. 74-80).

Nduma Defence for Congo

125. Sanctioned individual Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi and his group NDC continued to recruit and use children in 2014.[22] The Group interviewed six of the 33 children who separated from NDC in 2014, four of whom reported they had been kidnapped and forced to join NDC. The six children interviewed by the Group reported that children 12 years old and younger worked as porters of ammunition and magic talismans, while children over 12 years of age were escorts (combatants), cooks, marijuana farmers and tax collectors. Two children told the Group that they were in charge of collecting weekly and monthly taxes for general security in towns and at points of entry to gold mines (see annex 36).

126. The Congolese police specialized in the protection of children told the Group that NDC had many children in its ranks. In 2014, few children separated from NDC because the harshness of the penalties imposed on captured deserters deterred the children from trying to escape. In addition, Sheka paid the children salaries of about $10-12 a month, which was helpful to their families. Four children told the Group they had escaped as a result of attacks by the Congolese army that had dispersed NDC positions. One child mentioned that he had received death threats from his former colleagues after leaving the armed group.

127. The six children interviewed by the Group had witnessed numerous human rights violations against children and adults during their time in NDC, including the killing of one boy's 65-year-old grandfather, the murder of another boy's 12-year-old nephew, the death by stabbing of a soldier who tried to escape and the summary executions of seven people who lost their weapons on the battlefield.

Nyatura

128. Of the 1,125 children received by the transitory centre, 306 came from two Nyatura groups: Force de défense pour les droits humains and Nyatura intégré. The Group interviewed 10 children from these groups; seven had been recruited in 2014, two in 2013 and one in 2012. Children in Nyatura, like children in other groups, worked as cooks, porters, escorts (combatants) and cleaners; they were also forced to steal food for their commanders.

129 The Group noted a familiarity between the Nyatura recruiters and their host community with respect to child recruitment. Notably, three children said they knew their recruiters and saw them frequently in their community. They also said that on the day of their recruitment, they were asked or told to help transport items to the Nyatura rebel positions but then were not released upon arrival. Nine children told the Group they had surrendered in September with Nyatura "Colonel" Kigingi Machokotala.

130. Seven children told the Group that "Colonel" Kigingi was a recruiter, trainer and commander of child soldiers; 10 case files confirmed this information. One child

[22] In 2014, an NDC splinter group called NCD-Renouveau emerged, led by Guido, Sheka's former second in command.

identified "Colonel" Habarugira François as a commander of child soldiers; 27 files contained the same information. One child interviewed by the Group and 15 case files named "General" Ngwiti Kamegeri as a recruiter and commander of military units that included children.

Allied Democratic Forces

131. In 2014, ADF recruited, trained and used child soldiers (see S/2013/433, para. 94). In its midterm report, the Group noted that the Congolese army had claimed most ADF combatants were men (see S/2014/428, para. 12); the dozens of ADF ex-combatants, civilians and *bazana* who left ADF starting in June told a different story. The Group interviewed six children (aged 13-17 years) who had been soldiers for ADF, as well as two adult ex-combatants who had been soldiers when they were under 18 years of age. These eight ex-combatants told the Group that boys aged 13 and older typically received military training, although younger boys may also undergo military instruction (see S/2013/433, para. 94). Twenty-five ADF ex-combatants, civilians and *bazana* told the Group that ADF used many children as soldiers and porters in 2014 (see annex 6) and that many child soldiers were killed in combat. Of the six children and two adults interviewed by the Group, six identified Rafiki and three identified Werason as their military trainers (see annex 4).

B. Torture and mistreatment

132. ADF practices various forms of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as part of its justice system (see annex 9). Jamil Mukulu and Seka Baluku oversee a system that imposes punishments such as crucifixion; death by stoning; severe beatings even just for speech considered subversive; imprisonment in pits, underground cells and an "iron maiden" (see S/2014/428, annex 10); starvation during imprisonment; and summary execution. Two ex-combatants and an ADF civilian told the Group that the punishment for petty theft was the cutting off of a hand, while the penalty for rape or attempted rape was the loss of one foot and one hand.

C. Abduction and slavery

133. In 2014, ADF continued to abduct civilians from the periphery of its area of control (see S/2009/603, para. 373, S/2012/348, para. 20, and S/2013/433, para. 93). ADF called these abductees *bazana* and considered them slaves (see para. 6 and annex 7). One ex-combatant, four *bazana* and two local sources in Beni told the Group that when ADF elements abducted people, they often killed the men, sometimes after having them carry looted goods, but usually brought the women and children to the Madina camp. These sources also told the Group that *bazana* were automatically imprisoned, lived in inhuman conditions, were forced to convert to Islam (see para. 137), were used for forced labour and were forced to marry ADF men (see para. 139). Starting in August 2014, ADF resumed kidnapping people along the Mbau-Oicha-Eringeti axis to replenish its depleted ranks.

134. The four Congolese Médecins Sans Frontières staff captured in July 2013 were kept as *bazana* in the Madina camp (see S/2014/42, para. 146). In August 2014, the female nurse managed to escape but the fate of the three male staff remains uncertain.

D. Attacks on hospitals

135. The Group has confirmed that a primary objective of the attack carried out on Kamango by ADF on 11 and 12 July 2013 was to loot the hospital and other medical centres (see S/2014/42, para. 145). Two ADF ex-combatants, one *muzana* and a local source in Beni told the Group that ADF soldiers escorted Dr. Kalungi, an ADF doctor, to the hospital and clinics, where he selected the medications and medical equipment that ADF looted and transported to the Madina camp. Philippo, who at the time was the ADF chief of combat operations, was overall commander of the attack, but Nabweyo led the soldiers into Kamango.

136. The Group identified a variety of medicines and medical equipment when it visited the Madina camp on 22 April and 8 May 2014 (see S/2014/428, para. 32). The Group sent 28 requests for information about this material and received 14 responses, but was not able to establish a clear link to the medical facilities in Kamango or delivery to ADF by other means.

E. Forced conversion

137. ADF forces non-Muslims to convert to Islam. Four *bazana*, a child ex-combatant, an adult ex-combatant, an ADF civilian and a local source in Beni told the Group that ADF leaders give non-Muslims the choice to convert or be killed; those who do not immediately accept conversion are put in prison for a few days to think about their option. ADF normally targets Muslims for recruitment, but most of the people abducted by ADF and some who were deceived into joining were not Muslims. Ex-combatants told the Group that ADF typically killed the men it abducted because it was too difficult to force them to convert; the women and children were generally more compliant.

F. Sexual violence

138. Sexual violence, including forced marriage (see S/2013/433, para. 133), continues to be a problem in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. For example, during the first six months of 2014, the United Nations Population Fund documented 2,774 cases of sexual violence in North Kivu, of which approximately 70 per cent were committed by civilians, 15 per cent by Congolese soldiers or police officers and another 15 per cent by members of armed groups. The Group identified cases of sexual violence carried out by armed groups, including Mai Mai Yakutumba (see para. 109), the followers of the late Morgan (see para. 116) and Pygmy and Luba groups (see annex 33), as well as by men in Burundian military uniforms (see para. 90) and ADF.

139. ADF routinely forces girls and women to marry its soldiers and civilians. Three girls told the Group they were forced to marry ADF soldiers in 2013, when one was 14 years old and two were 15 years old; two of the girls had babies who died during the mid-2014 famine (see para. 13). A *muzana* and two local sources in Beni also told the Group that Bazana were forced to marry; a *muzana*, an ex-combatant and a civilian told the Group that Jamil Mukulu had *bazana* wives (see annex 7). Two ex-combatants and a *muzana* told the Group that girls and women (*bazana* and civilians) could theoretically refuse a marriage request, which was brokered by a woman named Senga, also known

as Mama Nasim (see annex 4). Nonetheless, the three girls mentioned above and a *muzana* told the Group they were forced to marry.

G. Massacre in Mutarule

140. On 6 June 2014, at least 34 people were killed and 25 injured in the village of Mutarule 2 in South Kivu (see annex 37). The Group investigated this massacre by visiting the village, interviewing survivors and local residents, talking to senior Congolese army officials and collecting ammunition from the village. The Group concludes that responsibility for the massacre lies with an armed group from nearby Mutarule 1 village and local Barundi leaders. A small army contingent stationed just outside Mutarule 2 initially responded and resisted the attackers, but retreated after running out of ammunition. According to witnesses, army officers and internal MONUSCO reports, the MONUSCO force stationed nearby failed to intervene despite repeated requests for assistance. The Group sought clarification from MONUSCO, which on 21 October reported that an internal investigation was under way.

141. Mutarule is along the main road between Bukavu and Uvira and is split into two: Mutarule 1 and Mutarule 2. Mutarule 1 consists of people from the Barundi and Banyamulenge groups; Mutarule 2 is comprised of Bafuliro people. Bafuliro Mai Mai groups have been active in the area for many years and have been accused of stealing cattle from Barundi and Banyamulenge herders. Karakara, who deserted the Congolese army, heads one of the Bafuliro Mai Mai groups near Mutarule.

142. The tensions between the two communities, heightened by the cattle thefts, have led some members of the Barundi community in Mutarule 1 to create their own militia. Congolese army and police officers and local people told the Group they had seen armed men associated with the Barundi militia active at night. In addition, the Group interviewed three Burundian men and one Burundian boy who had escaped from the Barundi militia in September 2014. These sources told the Group that they had been forced to join the militia, which is commanded by a Burundian citizen called Billy and whose deputy is called Zoros. The local chief (*chef de groupement*), Claude Mirundi, denied to the Group the presence of a militia in Mutarule 1.

143. On the afternoon of 6 June, members of the Mai Mai Karakara group stole hundreds of heads of cattle and killed a shepherd near Mutarule 2. According to an army officer, a MONUSCO report and a local source, the cattle belonged to South Kivu's military commander, General Pacifique Masunzu, who is a Munyamulenge (see S/2009/603, para. 48). The army's Company 2, which was stationed just outside Mutarule, was alerted to the theft but, when it responded, received gunfire from both the Mai Mai elements and the Barundi militia.

144. That night, between 8 and 9 p.m., a force armed with AK-47s and a machine gun entered Mutarule 2, attacked a church where people were praying and killed more than a dozen people. The force advanced and killed others in the village, including at the health centre; it also burned many houses.

145. Company 2, commanded by Captain Enabombi Changa Dejeune, again responded to the shooting and tried to protect civilians. Captain Enabombi called his superior officer, Major Kayumba Nyenyeri (1052nd Battalion), who was 9 km away from Mutarule, and asked for backup and ammunition. Major Nyeneri told Captain

Enabombi not to engage the attackers and did not dispatch reinforcements. Captain Dejeune's force eventually ran out of ammunition and retreated.

146. After the attack, General Masunzu ordered the arrest of Captain Enabombi, which generated considerable criticism, leading the General to arrest Major Nyenyeri. In September, the Congolese army released Captain Enabombi.

147. In a communication on 21 October 2014, MONUSCO informed the Group that the company operating base in Sange had been informed about the situation in Mutarule at around 5 or 6 p.m. on 6 June. The commander of the base, Pakistani Major Shaban, did not dispatch troops to investigate the situation; indeed, he did not send troops to Mutarule until the morning of 9 June. MONUSCO told the Group that the MONUSCO Brigade Commander subsequently relieved Major Shaban of his command, that the Major then returned to Pakistan and that MONUSCO had no way of reaching him for follow-up questions.

148. On the morning of 7 June, soldiers from Uvira deployed to Mutarule to investigate the situation. These soldiers collected some of the cartridges from expended ammunition. During its visit on 12 July to Mutarule, the Group also collected cartridges from sites where the Bafuliro militia attacked. The ammunition belonged to two specific calibres used for AK-47 rifles (7.62 x 39 mm) and for machine guns (7.62 x 54 mm). The Congolese army found a chain for machine gun ammunition in the village. The Burundian nationals whom the Group interviewed all testified to the presence of at least one machine gun, which would usually be held by those escorting their chief.

149. An analysis of the cartridges recovered by both the army and the Group showed that they had been produced in several countries (see annex 38), including Egypt in 1984. In 2011 and in 2012, Egypt duly notified the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) that it had made two deliveries of arms and ammunition to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some 1,000,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition produced in Egypt and manufactured in 1984 were part of those deliveries (see annex 39). The Group was not able to determine if the Egyptian ammunition from that delivery to the Congolese army was the same as that used by the attackers at Mutarule.

V. Arms

150. During the course of its mandate, the Group documented weapons and ammunition associated with ADF (see paras. 39-40), FDLR (see paras. 52-53) and the Mutarule massacre (see para. 149). The Group also inspected weapons caches suspected to have belonged to the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) (see S/2009/603, para. 12) and M23 (see S/2014/42, paras. 16 and 41). The Group initiated tracing requests based on these findings, which expose weaknesses in the process of making notifications to the Committee and highlight the importance of improved stockpile management by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

151. The most interesting finding for the Group was the discovery of 12.7 x 108 mm ammunition contained in black polyethylene bags at three sites: an alleged CNDP cache in Ngungu (North Kivu), an M23 cache in Chanzu (North Kivu) and an army position in the Madina camp (North Kivu). The factory identifiers on that ammunition and cartridges were consistent with production in China, but the origin of the black bags is unknown.

The Group notes that, in 2013, the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire found 12.7 x 108 mm ammunition consistent with production in China that was packed in black plastic bags consistent with packaging attributed to the Sudan (see S/2013/228, paras. 44-45 and 55). The Group shared with the Governments of China and the Sudan information related to its findings but neither Government provided information that enabled the Group to identify the origin of these rounds or the location where they were packaged.

152. Because the location where the ammunition was packaged could not be established conclusively, the Group had chemical analyses done of the black bags it recovered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as of similar black bags recovered in the Central African Republic and Somalia. The results showed that although the Congolese bags were of a similar chemical composition, they were not related to the samples from the Central African Republic and Somalia (see annex 40).

153. In April, the Group identified ammunition boxes in the possession of Congolese army units fighting ADF that showed contract information identifying a 2012 arms shipment from China to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex 41). In response to an enquiry from the Group, the Government of China acknowledged that the contract number corresponded to a delivery that had not been notified to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group asked China to provide a detailed accounting of the ammunition and weapons contained in this shipment but, as of late November, had not received a reply. The Group has also initiated other tracing requests for arms and ammunition recovered in 2014 (see annex 42).

154. The Group has previously noted problems with stockpile management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the Government's failure to mark weapons (see S/2009/603, para. 378 (subpara. 13, on stockpile management), and S/2012/843, para. 139) and the diversion of Congolese stocks to armed groups (see S/2009/603, paras. 23-29 and 40-43). This is significant because in 2014 the Group also identified that Congolese soldiers gave arms and ammunition to several armed groups, including FDLR, RUD and Mai Mai Yakutumba (see paras. 71 and 115 and annex 24). The Group also identified security and safety problems at an army stockpile in Goma and the lack of an inventory of arms and ammunition in South Kivu (see annex 43). The shortcomings in stockpile management and in the marking of arms and ammunition complicate efforts to identify how and from whom armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo get their weapons.

155. The Group reviewed all the notifications made to the Committee from 2004 to 2014 and noted that most of them lack sufficient detail to be of use to the Group in understanding the military equipment obtained by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the past decade. The Government has not responded to the Group's request for a detailed list of all arms and ammunition deliveries since 2003. The Group has also requested China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt and the Sudan to provide lists of all post-embargo arms deliveries to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; only Egypt has responded, and it did so in a manner that was detailed and helpful to the Group (see para. 149).

VI. Natural resources

A. Tantalum, tin and tungsten

Due diligence

156. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the International Tin Research Institute's tin supply chain initiative is the only traceability system for coltan, cassiterite and wolframite, which are transformed into tantalum, tin and tungsten respectively (see S/2014/428, paras. 81-84). In November, a senior official of the Ministry of Mines of the Democratic Republic of the Congo told the Group that the Government would soon sign a memorandum of understanding with the company GeoTraceability for a new system, which would break the monopoly of the International Tin Research Institute. A GeoTraceability official confirmed this information and told the Group that the company hoped to start working in the Democratic Republic of the Congo early in 2015.

157. Since the Group's midterm report was issued, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has certified as "green" seven mining sites in Walikale territory (see annex 44). In September, the "tagging and bagging" system of the tin supply chain initiative was launched in the area of Ngungu, Masisi territory, for the mines owned by the company Sakima. The North Kivu Minister of Mines told the Group that the mining sites in Masisi would soon be revalidated in order to conform with the ICGLR rule that a mine should be revalidated every six months. The Rubaya and Ngungu mines were first validated on 2 February 2014 and should have been revalidated before 2 August. The Minister also told the Group that he plans to start validating mining sites in Lubero and Beni territories.

158. The Group conducted two cases studies on tantalum, tin and tungsten in Rubaya, North Kivu, and Shabunda, South Kivu. The Group concludes that while progress has been made in Rubaya, many problems have yet to be resolved. The Group has confirmed that minerals from Rubaya are smuggled with the involvement of Congolese army officers, and that smugglers take minerals from Rubaya to Rwanda, despite Rwanda's recent efforts to improve transparency in its mineral sector. In Shabunda, the Group found that a Raia Mutomboki faction is controlling an area with cassiterite mines and deriving revenue from the trade in cassiterite.

159. As it did in 2012, the Group documented the sale of tin supply chain initiative tags (see S/2012/843, para. 172) and obtained two such tags in Bukavu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and two in Gisenyi, Rwanda. The availability of tags intended to ensure traceability is a sign that gaps in the system that enable smuggling still need to be addressed. Minerals from non-validated sites, such as those in areas of Shabunda controlled by Raia Mutomboki, could enter into the international supply chain with the tin supply chain initiative tags. The Group asked the International Tin Research Institute about the sale of tags, but had not received any answer as of late November.

Rubaya

160. In the Rubaya area of North Kivu, seven mining sites have been certified as "green". The Société minière de Bisunzu (SMB) (formerly called Mwangachuchu Hizi International) holds titles for all seven sites but only controls the D2 Bibatama mine (see S/2014/428, para. 85); the Cooperative des exploitants artisanaux miniers du

Masisi (Cooperamma) controls the other six sites. Cooperamma and SMB have signed a memorandum of understanding that requires Cooperamma to sell everything produced at its mining sites to SMB (see S/2014/42, para. 203, and S/2014/428, annex 31).

161. On 28 October, the Group visited Rubaya and investigated the bagging and tagging system at the sites under the control of Cooperamma. According to the tin supply chain initiative scheme, mining officials should be present to affix two tags on each bag of minerals in Rubaya, one belonging to the mine of origin and one belonging to the *négociant*. During its visit, the Group noticed that the *négociant* tag was still being affixed in a separate location (see S/2014/428, para. 87). In an e-mail communication on 29 October, the management of SMB told the Group that the decision to affix the négociant tag not in Rubaya but at the Cooperamma office in Goma instead (55 km from Rubaya) was taken in part because "traders were unwilling to bring money to the mine for security reasons".

162. The Group visited three washing stations that mining agents in Rubaya said were the main sites where minerals were washed for the last time before being dried, bagged and tagged (see annex 45). These washing stations were not located at the mine but, rather, in the town of Rubaya. Three *négociants* and one mineral washer told the Group that minerals were sometimes processed and dried in individual residences in Rubaya because there was not enough space at the washing stations to dry the minerals.

163. Three négociants in Rubaya and two in Goma told the Group that mining agents were not present on a regular basis where minerals were washed and dried, and that they sometimes showed up only after being summoned by *négociants* to affix the mines tag on bags. In the view of the Group, these are loopholes that facilitate the smuggling of the minerals.

164. During its interviews in North Kivu with miners, civil society organizations, provincial authorities and businessmen, the Group was repeatedly told that although smuggling had declined since the launch of the tin supply chain initiative system, it remained a problem. Provincial mining authorities told the Group that, between February and August 2014, they had seized nine shipments of minerals smuggled from Masisi (see annex 46). Three state agents at the Mubambiro checkpoint and one police agent in Sake, however, told the Group they were discouraged because sometimes minerals from Masisi territory were seized and then immediately released after the intervention of a higher governmental authority.

165. The Rubaya office of the provincial mining division provided data to the Group that shows declining official production since May (see S/2014/428, para. 86). In May, all the mines at Rubaya produced 135 tons of coltan, but a decline that started in June (79 tons) continued in September (70 tons) and October (57 tons). Three *négociants* and one miner in Rubaya told the Group that official production had dropped in part because of the onset of the rainy season; the three *négociants* added, however, that the decline was also a sign that minerals were being smuggled.

166. The Group discussed the causes of smuggling with three *négociants* in Rubaya and one worker at Cooperamma, who stated that SMB offered approximately 20 per cent less for the minerals than buyers in Rwanda offered. They also told the Group that in 2014 SMB was sometimes late in making payments, which led some *négociants* to sell minerals illegally. *Négociants* who are members of Cooperamma told the Group they would like to break the monopoly held by SMB on the minerals trade in Rubaya.

167. In response to an enquiry from the Group about the aforementioned issues, the management of SMB told the Group that the *négociants* were "paid twice a week for the most part". SMB told the Group the price it offered to the *négociants*. On the basis of that price and Group interviews with three *négociants* in Rubaya and a Cooperamma worker in Goma, the Group believes that the price in Rwanda is, in fact, 20 per cent higher than that at Rubaya.

168. The Group confirmed that Congolese army officers are involved in the smuggling of minerals from Masisi, as demonstrated by the two case studies below.

169. The following two paragraphs are based on the Group's interviews with seven Congolese army officers and soldiers, officials at the provincial ministry of mines and civil society organizations. In addition, the Group obtained a transcript of the arraignment hearing of army Colonel Hassan Mugabo-Baguma.

170. During the night between 20 and 21 February 2014, Congolese army officers arrested Colonel Mugabo at the checkpoint at Mubambiro, near Sake, after military police spotted bags of minerals in his vehicle. At the time, Colonel Mugabo was commander of the 85th sector. An inspection of the car determined that he had 21 bags of coltan, weighing 1,363 kg. He was heading to Goma from Bihambwe in the company of his driver (a civilian) and three soldiers. During his arraignment, Colonel Mugabo acknowledged that he had been arrested because he was transporting minerals in his vehicle but also said that he did not know who owned the minerals. In June, *négociant* Kabirigi Rukebesha claimed the minerals from the central bank in Goma, where they were being held. The Group confirmed that Mr. Rukebesha had sold a total of 898 kg of minerals to SMB on two occasions in 2014: in August (594 kg) and November (299 kg).

171. The 8th military region, at that time under the command of the late General Lucien Bahuma, freed Colonel Mugabo without further investigation or punishment; his case was not even referred to the military prosecutor.

172. The Group also confirmed that Congolese army Captain Mputu used an Kamaz truck belonging to the army to smuggle minerals from Rubaya. A *négociant*, a senior provincial mining official and two witnesses told the Group about the smuggling incident, which took place between 20 and 21 August (see annex 47). That night, Lieutenant Colonel Simweray-Kinyabuuma Pascal, commander of an army company in the 83rd sector of operations in Rubaya, tried to seize the truck in which Captain Mputu and 12 soldiers were transporting bags of minerals, but Lieutenant Colonel Simweray's superiors told him to release the truck. The only action taken by leaders of the 8th military region was to suspend Lieutenant Colonel Simweray (see annex 48). Two state agents told the Group that they had seen an army Kamaz truck in the night between 26 and 27 October carrying minerals through the Mubambiro checkpoint.

Rwanda

173. The Group met with people involved in the minerals trade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, businessmen, Congolese mining agents, a senior official at the North Kivu ministry of mines, officers of the mining police in Goma and representatives of civil society organizations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, all of whom said that minerals from Rubaya were being smuggled to Rwanda. Such smuggling is facilitated by the availability of Rwandan tags and associated documents

on the black market, which can be purchased and used to insert smuggled or stolen minerals into the international supply chain.[23]

174. Two people involved in the minerals trade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and a North Kivu mining agent gave the Group detailed accounts of how minerals from Rubaya were sent to Goma and then Gisenyi, Rwanda; their accounts matched information already reported by the Group (see S/2014/42, para. 204). The same sources told the Group that the main mineral smuggled through Goma was "white coltan", which is only produced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Once in Rwanda, white coltan is darkened or mixed with black coltan produced in Rwanda before being introduced into the supply chain. The Group investigated two specific cases of suspected smuggling of white coltan from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Rwanda involving the Rwandan companies CIMIEX and Union Mines.

175. In response to an enquiry from the Group, the Government of Rwanda replied that, in December 2013, "CIMIEX is purported to have supplied 10 tons of the 'white coltan' to AD Trade International (exporter)" (see annex 49). To determine whether the minerals had been smuggled, the Government of Rwanda had them compared to samples from the mining sites that had been "fingerprinted" as part of Rwanda's traceability efforts. The Government of Rwanda told the Group that, for the CIMIEX minerals, the field (mine) samples and the consignment (suspect) samples "do not appear to be plausibly similar". During the investigation, the Government of Rwanda suspended CIMIEX and AD Trade International from the tin supply chain initiative for six months. CIMIEX denied that it had supplied the white coltan to AD Trade International, which was allowed to sell the minerals after a warning about the incident was issued to members of the initiative, and AD Trade International agreed to notify buyers that the minerals came from an indeterminate source.

176. In the same letter to the Group about CIMIEX, the Government of Rwanda also noted that "Union Mines provided 1.8 tons of 'white coltan' to Phoenix Metals (exporter/comptoir)". Phoenix Metals told the Group that, in December 2013, it had received a consignment of 1,011.7 kg of coltan from Union Mines. The Government of Rwanda told the Group that the mineralogical and chemical comparison of the coltan sample showed that there was not "any significant difference" between "the mineral consignments and field samples from the mines reported to have been the sources of the minerals"; Phoenix Metals told the Group that its own testing, however, showed that the consignment sample contained two types of coltan. The company's test found that 80 per cent of the sample was made up of black coltan of the kind mined in Rwanda and that 20 per cent was made up of white coltan, which was not found in Rwanda.

177. During its investigation into the consignment, the Government of Rwanda suspended Union Mines from the tin supply chain initiative for six months.[24] Phoenix Metals told the Group that it had not purchased the minerals because of doubts about their origin; the Government of Rwanda, however, told the Group that the "minerals

[23] The Group found that the tags were sold at different prices depending on the total weight of the bags to be smuggled; each bag typically weighs 60-70 kg. Large quantities of coltan (e.g. 500 kg) typically cost 300 Rwandan francs ($0.44) per kilogram while small quantities of coltan (e.g. 100-200 kg) cost 400 Rwandan francs ($0.58) per kilogram.

[24] The Government of Rwanda also suspended Union Mines in 2011 for a period of six months, in part because, according to the April 2012 Channel Research report *iTSCi Field Governance Assessment Rwanda*, "production levels from that site were not possible given the number of diggers working there; the mine is buying material from outside".

were handed back by Phoenix Metals because they could not agree on a price" (see annex 49).

178. The Group acknowledges the responsible actions taken by the Government of Rwanda in investigating the two cases involving white coltan, as well as its suspension of suspected wrongdoers, but notes that the origin of the minerals in question has not been ascertained and that the suppliers to CIMIEX and Union Mines have not been identified. In May and August, the Government of Rwanda told the Group that it had not seized any minerals smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2014.

179. Two people involved in the minerals trade in Rwanda and a civil society organization told the Group that small-scale mineral traders in Rwanda play a crucial role in the laundering of Congolese minerals. According to these sources, exporters in Kigali provide money to small-scale traders who buy minerals that are either smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or stolen or diverted from Rwandan mines. This is done with the tags and official papers delivered in the framework of the tin supply chain initiative, which can be obtained in Rwanda. In fact, the Group obtained two tags for Rwandan mines and all the necessary documents from the cooperative Kamico (Kamusheshe Mining Cooperative) (see annex 50). With such tags and papers, anyone could introduce coltan into the supply chain in Rwanda.

180. In 2014, the Government of Rwanda issued new conditions, such as evidence of financial capacity and of adding value to minerals, for traders' licences in the mining sector. The Group acknowledges that the new conditions could help to reduce involvement in smuggling and criminal activity by small-scale mineral traders.

Shabunda

181. Armed groups and the illegal minerals trade coexist in Shabunda territory, South Kivu (see S/2014/42, paras. 68-70). The Group has confirmed that the Raia Mutomboki faction of "General" Juriste Kikuni receives money from taxing economic activities, including the trade in cassiterite. In addition, since there are no certified mines in Shabunda territory, all mineral production and trade is technically illegal. Nonetheless, minerals produced in the Mapimo area of Shabunda territory are regularly flown from Shabunda town airport to Bukavu (see annex 51) and minerals produced in the area of Lulingu, also in Shabunda territory, are flown from Tchonka airport to the same destination.

182. The Group reviewed flight manifests for Lulingu and Shabunda airports, which show that seven aviation companies using 10 planes transported cassiterite to Bukavu in 2014. The Group notes that, with the exception of Goma Express and Business Aviation, two companies blacklisted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the companies were acting legally in that they have all the paperwork and authorizations required to transport cassiterite (see annex 51). That said, the transportation of minerals that have been produced and traded illegally violates the spirit of international due diligence efforts.

Lulingu and Kikuni

183. The Lulingu area of Shabunda territory has many cassiterite mines. Cassiterite from those mines is flown out of Tchonka airport, near the town of Lulingu (see S/2008/773, para. 86). The area is controlled by Kikuni's Raia Mutomboki faction, which taxes the trade in goods, including cassiterite.

184. Five sources, including businessmen, civil society organizations and mining agents, told the Group that Kikuni had established a system of taxation of any good imported into or exported from the area. The Group obtained documents showing that even the territorial office of the provincial ministry of mines has paid Kikuni 20 per cent of its income, which is the norm he imposed in the area (see annex 52).

185. The Group consulted manifests of the planes that left Tchonka airport from 1 January to 23 October 2014. According to those documents, a total of 177,323 kg of cassiterite were flown to Bukavu (see annex 53); mining authorities in Lulingu authorized these shipments (see annex 54). The Group was unable to determine how much revenue Kikuni derives from taxing the exports and the flights. Several sources also told the Group that Kikuni charges 350 francs ($0.39) per bag of minerals flown out of Tchonka; the Group was unable to determine exactly how many bags have been flown out.

186. Raia Mutomboki was originally formed to oppose the presence of FDLR in the area (see S/2014/42, para. 68) but, since removing that group from Shabunda, various Raia Mutomboki factions, including the one led by Kikuni, have kept their arms and focused on making money.

Mapimo, Shabunda territory

187. The Mapimo area of Shabunda territory is adjacent to the border with Maniema Province and across the Ulindi River from Shabunda town. There are no certified mines in Mapimo but many active mining sites are producing cassiterite. The Group observed people bringing minerals from Mapimo across the river, which were then transported on bicycles into Shabunda town. Businessmen and mining agents in Shabunda town told the Group that minerals produced in Maniema could be transported there through Mapimo and then mixed with minerals from South Kivu. The Group reviewed the manifests of flights from Shabunda town between 1 January and 23 October 2014 (see annex 53), which show that 35,347 kg of cassiterite were flown to Bukavu.

188. The Group investigated the storage in Bukavu of minerals flown from Shabunda and Lulingu. *Négociants* and mining authorities told the Group that minerals were stored in warehouses and not exported but could not point to the locations of any such warehouses.

189. In Bukavu, the Group obtained two Congolese tags and the associated paperwork, which authorize the legal export of minerals through the tin supply chain initiative system (see annex 55). The availability of the tags in Bukavu means that once minerals from Shabunda and Lulingu have arrived they can be tagged, identified as originating from mine that has been certified as "conflict free" and sold legally on the international market.

B. Gold

190. In 2014, the Group confirmed the persistent absence of due diligence and traceability efforts in the gold sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates, which makes it possible for gold produced in conflict areas and at unvalidated mining sites to enter the international supply chain. Moreover, gold continued to be smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Uganda and smuggled gold continued to be purchased by Kampala-based businessmen,

including the directors of sanctioned entities Uganda Commercial Impex (UCI) and Machanga Limited.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

191. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo provided the Group with statistics showing that between 1 January and 30 June 2014 five comptoirs exported 151 kg of gold produced by artisanal and small-scale miners in the country (see annex 56). The Group believes that this figure is far below actual export levels (see S/2014/42, paras. 170-171) and that it is indicative of the lack of progress in combatting smuggling in 2014. Two case studies on gold in South Kivu are set out below.

192. In October 2014, the Group visited Shabunda territory, where it interviewed businessmen and miners who stated that gold mining has increased since January, particularly with the use of dredges on the Ulindi River. Four owners of dredges and civil society officials told the Group that approximately 40 dredges are currently being used.[25] Men using dredges and a mining official told the Group that, on a good day, a dredge can produce about 60 g of gold. Some days, however, dredges produce no gold at all.

193. Mining authorities told the Group that, since May, dredges have moved up the Ulindi River into areas controlled by Raia Mutomboki factions. Three dredge owners, one businessman and two mining authorities told the Group they had to pay taxes, either in money or gold, to the Raia Mutomboki factions of Sisawa, Kimba and Alexandre. Two dredge owners told the Group they had paid $1,700 each to have their dredges in Raia Mutomboki-controlled areas, while a third dredge owner reported paying $1,500 for the same right. The same sources added that periodically they had to pay a percentage of their production to Raia Mutomboki elements.

194. When the Group asked three gold *négociants* in Shabunda if they bought gold from Raia Mutomboki elements or from mines in the areas controlled by them, the *négociants* told the Group that they would purchase from any source. Two *négociants*, one agent of the Ministry of Mines in Shabunda and two freight companies told the Group that gold from Shabunda was traded in Bukavu.

195. In July, the Group documented that the Congolese army was carrying out activities in the Misisi gold-mining area in South Kivu (see S/2014/42, para. 162). The Group observed an army position between the mining area and the processing area, through which miners and transporters must pass. Miners told the Group that they must pay 500 francs ($0.56) daily when they pass the army position; transporters on bicycles told the Group that they paid the same amount each time they passed the position carrying gold-bearing rocks (see annex 57).[26] A senior Congolese army officer told the Group that the soldiers present in Misisi in July were from the 1012nd Regiment commanded by Colonel Samy Matumo (see S/2014/42, para. 162, S/2010/596, paras. 35-36, and S/2009/603, para. 124.

196. The Group confirmed that Congolese army officers, including Colonel Samy, own crushers at Misisi, which break up rocks so that they can be processed to extract gold.

[25] Many of these dredges were recently moved to Shabunda from Osso River (see S/2014/42, para. 166).

[26] The Group could not determine exactly how many people cross the army position every day; therefore we could not estimate how much income FARDC officers and soldiers may derive from taxes. From interviews with SAESCAM authorities, the management of the cooperative, the leaders of the association of cyclists, the Group believes that several thousand diggers and cyclists cross the checkpoint per day.

The Group has obtained an undated list of crusher owners who do not pay taxes and a letter from an army officer about his crusher, both of which confirm such ownership (see annex 58). The list of crusher owners also includes William Yakutumba, the leader of Mai Mai Yakutumba (see para. 106).

197. The Group notes that the Congolese mining law is not clear as to the legality of army officials owning crushers, which enable them to derive revenue from gold mining and trading. The Group discussed this issue with mining authorities, army officers and civil society representatives, and found a lack of consensus on the legality or illegality of this practice. The Group sent a letter to the Government asking for clarification on this issue, but has not received a response as of late November.

198. The Group found that one gold seizure occurred in 2014 in Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 11 May, Jean Pierre Mwenga Kasonga and Jean Marc Kimpese Musinga were arrested at Kisangani airport while waiting to fly to Kinshasa (see annex 59). According to the Congolese intelligence agency in Kisangani, the two men were carrying 3.2 kg of gold, which they said they had bought from miners in Nia Nia, Orientale Province, although they lacked receipts. They also said they had bought gold in Bujumbura, Bukavu and Goma. The seized gold was at first kept at the local Central Bank after having been made into ingots. On 26 July, a court sentenced the two men to a $50,000 fine but ordered the restitution of the gold to the smugglers.

Uganda

199. In 2014, the Group reaffirmed that gold produced in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo was smuggled to Kampala (see S/2014/42, paras. 182-188). Twelve gold *négociants*, miners, government agents and other sources told the Group that gold traded in Butembo (North Kivu), Mambasa (Orientale), Bunia (Orientale) and Dungu (Orientale) was sold in Kampala to the directors of sanctioned entities UCI and Machanga Limited, as well as other buyers. Although Kampala has long been a destination for gold produced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2001/357, para. 136, and S/2014/42, para. 182), the Government of Uganda informed the Group that official exports for the period from 1 January to 15 October 2014 amounted to less than 15 kg and that all of that gold was produced in Uganda (see annex 60).

200. The Group interviewed three sources in Butembo and two sources in Kampala who said that Butembo traders bought gold produced in North Kivu and Orientale provinces and then smuggled it to Kampala. Two of the sources told the Group that gold produced in mines near Kasugho and Bunyatenge that are controlled by armed groups, including NDC/Sheka, FDLR and Mai Mai Lafontaine (see para. 80), is sold to gold traders in Butembo.

201. The Group interviewed one gold miner and two other sources in Dungu who said that gold illegally produced in Gangala na Bodio, part of Garamba National Park (see para. 217), was traded in Kampala. Two sources in Mambasa informed the Group that gold produced in and around the Okapi Fauna Reserve, including gold from areas controlled by the armed group formerly known as Mai Mai Morgan (see S/2014/428, para. 65), was traded in Mambasa and then transported to Butembo or Bunia (and on to Kampala), as well as to Kisangani. Two sources in Bunia and two sources in Kampala told the Group that Bunia gold traders smuggled gold produced in Orientale Province to Kampala. The Group has identified five major gold traders in Kampala that buy gold smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see below).

202. On 3 October, the Group wrote to the Government of Uganda asking for data on gold imports and exports, seizures of smuggled gold and arrests of smugglers. The Group also requested a meeting on 30 October to give the Government a right of reply to the Group's finding that the trade in gold smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued unabated in 2014, and requested that the Government invite directors of sanctioned entities UCI and Machanga Limited, as well other known gold traders in Kampala, to attend the meeting to exercise their own right of reply.

203. On 22 October, the Government of Uganda asked the Group to postpone its visit because it had opened investigations into Kampala-based gold traders. The Group instead invited the Government of Uganda to submit a written response by no later than 3 November. On 4 November, Uganda submitted a letter to the Group that provided gold export statistics, as noted above, but did not address any of the other requests made by the Group with respect to gold and did not include responses from the gold traders.

204. The Group has previously reported that the directors of UCI continued to trade in gold produced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after the imposition of sanctions on UCI in March 2007 (see S/2008/773, para. 100, S/2009/603, paras. 133 and 243, and S/2014/42, para. 184). The Group finds that, in 2014, the directors of UCI purchased gold that was illegally exported out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and illegally imported into Uganda. The evidence is consistent with the Group's previous findings and has been confirmed by four individuals involved in the gold trade in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, two individuals in close contact with gold traders in Kampala and observations by the Group in Kampala. The directors of UCI are Jamnadas V. Lodhia, Kunal J. Lodhia and Jitendra J. Lodhia (see annex 61). They have business links with Shiva Reddy (see S/2008/773, para. 98) and buy gold at Plot 22, Kanjokya Street, Kampala (see S/2014/42, annex 72), which is the registered address for UCI and Aurum Roses, another company owned by the Lodhias.

205. In September 2014, the Group observed a silver Nissan Pathfinder with a Congolese licence plate arrive at Plot 22 (see annex 62). The Group observed two men exit the vehicle and enter Plot 22. Congolese authorities informed the Group that the licence plate was registered to Baseke Bahemuka, also known as Gad Bahemuka. Three sources told the Group that Mr. Bahemuka was a gold trader and the owner of a petrol station in Bunia, Ituri district.

206. The Group has previously reported that the directors of Machanga Limited continued to trade in gold produced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after the imposition of sanctions on the company in March 2007 (see S/2008/773, para. 91, S/2009/603, para. 243, S/2012/843, para. 183, and S/2014/42, para. 185). The Group finds that, in 2014, the former directors of Machanga, especially Rajendra "Raju" Vaya, purchased gold illegally exported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and illegally imported into Uganda. The evidence is consistent with the Group's previous findings and was confirmed by two individuals involved in the gold trade in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and one individual in close contact with gold traders in Kampala. Raju buys gold at Plot 5A, Upper Kololo Terrace, Kampala (see annex 63 and S/2014/428, annex 73).

207. In 2014, Sameer (Sammy) Bhimji traded in gold illegally exported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and illegally imported into Uganda. The evidence is consistent with the Group's previous findings (see S/2012/843, para. 193, and

S/2014/42, para. 186) and was confirmed by two individuals involved in the gold trade in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and two individuals in close contact with gold traders in Kampala. Mr. Bhimji buys gold at Plot 3, Clement Hill Road, Kampala, which is the registered address for Midas All Minerals (see annex 64). Mr. Bhimji is the Managing Director of Midas All Minerals; other directors are Lata Bhimji (a national of the United Kingdom) and Hajati Anuna Omari (a national of Uganda). Neither Midas All Minerals nor Mr. Bhimji had any official exports between January and October 2014 (see annex 60). Mr. Bhimji also works with Ali Adnan (see annex 64).

208. In 2014, Silver Minerals traded in gold illegally exported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and illegally imported into Uganda. The evidence is consistent with previous findings of the Group (see S/2012/843, para. 190) and was confirmed by three individuals in close contact with gold traders in Kampala. In 2000, Madadali S. Pirani and his daughter Marium M. Pirani incorporated Silver Minerals in Uganda. In 2014, Mr. Pirani died; his daughter continues to run the company. Silver Minerals buys gold at Plot 190B, Tufnel Drive, Kamwokya, Kampala (see annex 65). Between January and October 2014, Silver Minerals officially exported 0.5 kg of gold to the United Arab Emirates (see annex 60).

209. In 2014, Barnabas Taremwa traded in gold illegally exported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and illegally imported into Uganda. Two individuals involved in the gold trade in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and two individuals in close contact with Kampala gold traders confirmed Mr. Taremwa's role in trading Congolese gold. Mr. Taremwa is the majority shareholder of Westcorp Mining Limited and is involved in other businesses in Uganda.

United Arab Emirates

210. The United Arab Emirates has long been a destination of gold smuggled out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through neighbouring States (see S/2005/30, para. 119, S/2007/423, paras. 124-126, and S/2008/773, para. 93). At the end of 2013, the Government of the United Arab Emirates undertook measures to address gold coming from conflict zones but those measures continue to fall short of the recommendations made by the Group in 2010 to ensure due diligence and traceability (see S/2010/596, paras. 299-300). As evidence of this shortcoming, in September 2014 the Group documented the willingness of jewellers in the gold souk of Dubai's Deira district to buy gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo without asking questions about its origin and without requesting proof that export taxes had been paid.

211. In a letter dated 19 March 2014, authorities of the United Arab Emirates informed the Group that they had established a high-level national committee, chaired by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Economy, to maintain the country's commitment to the highest standards within the world gold market. The authorities also said that the committee would provide recommendations for tackling the imbalances caused by gold trading from zones of conflict (see annex 66). The Group visited the United Arab Emirates in September and believes that the achievements of the committee so far are uncertain. The Group has been told that the committee has met only once and that it has planned some activities for late 2014. On 8 September, the Group requested more details on the plans of the committee but did not receive a response as of late November.

212. During the Group's September visit, authorities of the United Arab Emirates told the Group that only consolidated statistics per country were available, which shows the impossibility for Dubai importers to know the specific mines from where the gold is

imported. The Group was unable to obtain import statistics from the United Arab Emirates prior to the submission of this report.

213. The Dubai Multi Commodities Centre told the Group about its continuous efforts to make the gold trade in Dubai more responsible, mainly through the Responsible Market Participant initiative. In response to a Group request for more information, the United Arab Emirates stated that, as at 18 November, only one company, Kaloti Jewellery International, was involved in the initiative.

214. When the Group visited the gold souk in Dubai, four different jewellers said that they purchased gold from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo without any difficulty. The jewellers explained to the Group that the process of buying gold takes one day: the client gives the gold (in powder or nugget form) to a laboratory in the souk, where it is tested for purity; then, a workshop in the souk melts the sample and creates an ingot; finally, the client sells the ingot to the jeweller, who pays in cash, offering five dollars less per gram than the international price that day.

215. All the jewellers confirmed to the Group that they needed only an identification card and a document from the customs at Dubai airport, which, they said, were not difficult to obtain. The Group asked Dubai authorities about the reporting requirements for people bringing gold in their luggage through the airport, but did not receive a satisfactory response as of late November. Nevertheless, a representative of one Dubai refinery told the Group that customs officers did not ask where the gold came from or where it would be sold.

C. Wildlife products

216. The killing of wildlife and trafficking in wildlife products is commonplace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While wildlife is sometimes killed for food, such killing and the illegal trade in meat, ivory and other wildlife products also helps to fund armed groups and criminal enterprises. The Group investigated the situation at Garamba National Park, but received reports about similar dynamics in other parks and areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group also followed up on the case of the Congolese businessman whose ivory shipment had been seized in October 2013 in Kampala, and confirmed the illegality of his actions under Congolese law (see annex 67).

Garamba National Park

217. The killing of elephants and other animals in Garamba National Park remains a serious problem (see S/2014/42, paras. 226-233). Between 1 April and 22 September 2014, park officials found 114 elephant carcasses, including of a pregnant elephant with a near-term foetus (see annex 68). Although park officials report the actual number of elephant kills is likely to be higher than ground patrols and aerial surveillance are able to detect, this figure suggests that an elephant is killed in Garamba on at least two of every three days.

218. Since April, park authorities have pursued a robust approach to combat poaching that has included joint ground patrols with the Congolese army in the northern part of Garamba and in the adjunct hunting domains of Azande and Mondo Missa. Park authorities are trying to involve the army in conservation, although some officers and soldiers still engage in poaching (see para. 220 and S/2014/42, paras. 229-230). Park authorities have also increased the frequency of aerial patrols using its two aircraft, and

are involved in the Forest and Climate Change in the Congo project, which makes use of a small drone to map human activity in the park, conduct wildlife surveys and combat poaching (see annex 69). Human activity is significant in some areas of the park, such as Gangala na Bodio hunting domain, where gold and diamond mining, as well as timber harvesting for charcoal and wood, threaten wildlife, including elephants.

219. Poachers from South Sudan continue to operate in Garamba National Park (see S/2014/42, para. 231). According to park authorities and two sources in Dungu, professional hunters and deserters from the army and the police of South Sudan are active in the northern part of the park and the adjacent hunting domains; these poachers take ivory back to South Sudan. In September, a joint park- army patrol clashed with a group of South Sudanese poachers and killed one man who was wearing a South Sudanese police uniform (see annex 70). In November, park authorities informed the Group that a large armed group from South Sudan had entered Garamba Park.

220. The Congolese army continues to be a significant actor in poaching in Garamba. Three men arrested for poaching, two sources in Dungu and park authorities told the Group that some soldiers and officers give AK-47s and ammunition to local poachers, who bring back ivory and return the rifles after the hunting trips (see S/2014/42, para. 229). Four sources told the Group that army officers based in Faradje are involved in the distribution of guns for poaching.

221. Local hunters also work independently of the Congolese army to kill wildlife. According to park authorities and local sources in Dungu, hunters from the Dungu, Kiliwa, Duru and Faradje areas on the periphery of the park continue, as they have done for a long time, to kill wildlife for meat and ivory. In September, park authorities arrested three men living close to park boundaries who each had a locally made 12-calibre shotgun, and one man who had an AK-47 rifle. In Dungu, the Group observed 12-calibre ammunition produced by Manufacture d'armes et des cartouches du Congo (MACC) and a locally-made 12 calibre rifle for sale (see annex 71). In response to a request from the Group, MACC, which manufactures ammunition in the Congo, said that it did not export the ammunition to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, South Sudan or Uganda (see S/2012/843, para. 138).

222. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is also engaged in poaching at Garamba. According to park authorities and three sources in Dungu, LRA poaching has increased since March. LRA takes most of the ivory to the Central African Republic but buries some of it for retrieval at a later date.

223. Unknown hunters using helicopters to corral and shoot elephants have returned to Garamba (see S/2014/42, para. 232). In August, park rangers found eight elephants that had been killed by being shot from above (see annex 72). Following this discovery and other evidence that elephants were being killed from poachers on helicopters, park authorities announced they would shoot at helicopters flying low over the park.

VII. Recommendations

224. The Group makes the recommendations set out below.

Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

225. The Group recommends that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

(a) Amend the mining code to prohibit Congolese army officers and soldiers from owning, in whole or in part, rock crushers and dredges (see paras. 196-197);

(b) Investigate and prosecute the Congolese army officers and soldiers mentioned in this report who violate the mining and military codes by smuggling tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold and who engage in the illegal production of and trade in charcoal and wood (see paras. 77 and 169-172);

(c) Prohibit government agencies in Shabunda territory from paying taxes to the armed group Raia Mutomboki (see para. 184);

(d) Investigate and prosecute the individuals and entities mentioned in the present report responsible for recruiting, training and using child soldiers in violation of the sanctions regime (see paras. 118-131).

Government of Rwanda

226. The Group recommends that the Government of Rwanda investigate and prosecute, as necessary, Kamico and others involved in the illegal sale of tags and paperwork for tin, tantalum and tungsten, as well as the laundering of minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Rwanda (see para. 179).

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

227. The Group recommends that ICGLR launch a traceability mechanism for gold mined in the region that includes guidelines for dredges (see paras. 192-193).

Governments of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

228. The Group recommends that the Governments of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo investigate cases of sexual violence and abuse by the Burundian army and the Burundian Imbonerakure youth group in the Kiliba area of South Kivu, and that it prosecute those responsible (see para. 90).

Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Kingdom

229. The Group recommends that the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Kingdom investigate the individuals identified in this report who are involved in the financing, material support and recruitment networks of ADF, and take appropriate action to end support by those individuals to this sanctioned entity (see paras. 15-38).

Government of South Sudan

230. The Group recommends that the Government of South Sudan investigate and address the movement of armed elements and poachers from South Sudan to Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the trade in ivory originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see para. 219).

Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates

231. The Group recommends that the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates exchange information to ensure that gold is traded in compliance with international transparency and due diligence standards, namely by requiring full documentation, including a certificate of origin (see paras. 190-215).

Security Council

232. The Group recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Encourage the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICGLR and SADC to strictly adhere to the measures imposed by the agreement of 2 July 2014, which requires the full disarmament, surrender and relocation of FDLR by 2 January 2015 (see paras. 64-68);

(b) Reiterate, in its next resolution on the sanctions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the provisions on the notifications concerning arms, ammunition and training set out in section 11 of the guidelines of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the conduct of its work (see para. 155).

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community

233. The Group recommends that ICGLR and SADC ensure the prompt repatriation of M23 former combatants and political cadres, and that they resolve the fate of those not granted amnesty by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see paras. 91-101).

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes Region

234. The Group recommends that the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes Region develop a clear process and timeline, with relevant stakeholders, for addressing the fate of Rwandan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, separate from the process to resolve the fate of FDLR (see paras. 48 and 59).

Member States

235. The Group recommends that all Member States require that all deliveries of arms and ammunition to the Democratic Republic of the Congo be subject to written confirmation from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that stockpiles of arms and ammunition are managed in full compliance with international guidance, as identified in the present report, and that Member States provide the Committee with copies of such confirmations (see para. 154).

Annex 1

Organizations and entities the Group officially met with during its mandate

GREAT LAKES REGION

Burundi

Government

- Ministère de l'Energie et des Mines
- Force de Défense Nationale
- Service National de Renseignement
- Office burundais des recettes
- Service Enquêtes Douanières

Organizations

- Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
- International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Government

- Administration du district du Tanganyika, Katanga
- Administration du territoire de Walikale
- Administration provinciale du territoire Orientale, Mambasa
- Agence nationale de renseignement (ANR)
- Agence Penitencière du Katanga
- Auditorat militaire
- Autorité de l'Aviation Civile (AAC)
- Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification (CEEC)
- Direction générale des douanes et accises (DGDA)
- Direction générale des migrations (DGM)
- Direction générale des recettes administratives, domaniales et de participation (DGRAD)
- Etat-major de l'Armée de l'Air
- Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC)
- Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature (ICCN)
- Ministère des mines
- Police des mines
- Police Spéciale pour la Protection de l'Enfant et de la Femme, North Kivu
- Régie des voies aériennes (RVA)
- Service d'appui et d'assistance au *small-scale mining* (SAESSCAM)

Private sector

- Cetraca Air Service (CAS)
- Coopérative des Exploitants Miniers Artisanaux de Masisi (Cooperama)
- Coopérative Minière de Kimbi
- Etablissements Namukaya
- Métaux Précieux
- Société Minière de Bisunzu (former MHI)

Organizations

- Actions des Chrétiens Activistes des Droits de l'Homme à Shabunda
- African Parks Network, Garamba National Park
- American Bar Association (ABA)
- Association pour le développement des initiatives Paysannes
- Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR)
- Caritas

Centre de Recherche sur l'Environnement, la Démocratie et les Droits de l'Homme
Comité local de lutte contre les violences sexuelles
Concert d'Action pour les Jeunes Enfants Défavorisés (CAJED)
Embassy of France
Embassy of the United States
Enfant Pour l'Avenir et le Développement (EAD)
Heal Africa North Kivu
Human Rights Watch
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
International Emergency and Development Aid North Kivu
Justice pour Tous
Mechem
Mine Action Group (MAG)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Programme d'Appui à la Lutte contre la Misère
Saiped
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO)
United Nations Mine Action Service (UN MAS)
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)
United Nations Population Fund (UNFP)
Voix des minorités indigènes Katanga
World Teachers Federation
World Food Program (WFP)

Rwanda

Government

Geology and Mines Department
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission

United Republic of Tanzania

Government

Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Energy and Minerals
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Industry and Trade
Office of the President
Tanzania Revenue Authority

Uganda

Government

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Mines
Uganda People's Defence Force
Uganda Revenue Authority
Uganda Wildlife Authority

Organizations

Embassy of the United Kingdom

Embassy of the USA
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

OUTSIDE THE GREAT LAKES REGION

Belgium
Organizations
International Peace Information Service (IPIS)
University of Antwerp
University of Ghent
University of Liège

France
Government
Ministry of Defence
Organizations
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

The Netherlands
Organizations
PAX

United Arab Emirates
Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Economy
Federal Customs Authority
Central Bank
Organizations
Dubai Multi Commodities Center (DMCC)

United Kingdom
Government
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Organization
GeoTraceability
Global Witness
International Tin Research Institute (ITRI)

United States
Government
State Department
Treasury Department
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Organizations
Columbia University
Harvard University
Interpol
University of California, Berkeley

Annex 2

Group of Experts' official communications

During the mandate, the Group addressed 143 official communications to Member States, international organizations and entities (including multiple communications to the same addressees).

The Group received responses from the Governments or governmental offices of Armenia, Belgium, Burundi, China, DRC Commission Eléctorale Nationale Indépendante, Egypt, France, Orientale Province (DRC) Direction Générale des Impôts, Rwanda, Rwanda Ministry of Health, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom National Health Service.

The Group did not receive responses from the Governments or government offices of Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Iran, Israel, Poland, Russia, Sudan, United States of America, and the U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region.

The Group received responses from the following international organizations and entities: APDL, Careplus Ltd., CDET Explosives, Colt, Dawa Ltd., Entel, Farnham Pharmaceutical, ITRI, KBI, LDI, Lebanese Explosive Company, MACC, Macleods, MAF, Malteser International, Mission Pharma, Orchid Biomedical, Royal Group, Serum Institute of India, Societé Minière de Bisunzu, Solar Industries India Ltd., Special Representative to the Secretary-General – MONUSCO, Thuraya, Vodacom, Western Union.

The Group did not receive responses from the following international organizations and entities: Airtel, Ask Direct, Asrames, Aurobindo, Compagnie Africaine d'Aviation (CAA), Dow Regional Headquarters, FDS Limited Uganda, Galenica Senese, Geepas, Intrachem, Jiangxi Xier, Kangtain, JMS Kampala, Medical Export Group, Metralco, Motorola, MSA Mzinga Corp., Nairobi, Saint Helier Hospital, South African Airways, South Thames College, Tuntise, Xuyi Webest Medical, and Yanzhou Xier Kangtain.

Annex 3

ADF Mukulu group

In mid-April 2014, as FARDC forces approached Madina camp, Jamil Mukulu led a group of approximately 30 people out of Madina camp to an unidentified destination. As of late November, the whereabouts of the Mukulu group remain unknown. The following list is compiled from information provided by four ex-ADF members, one Bazana, and a source in Beni. A table at the end of this annex contains photos of some leaders who left with Jamil Mukulu.

1. **Jamil Mukulu** aka Muzei or Mzee, Kyagulanyi, Emir, Professor, Jeremy. Jamil is the spiritual and political leader of ADF. Jamil also leads the 8000, or Kanana, an elite society of senior ADF leaders (see annex 10). Jamil has at least three wives (Aisha, Sumayya, and Mariam) and fifteen children. Jamil's sons and daughters had the honorific title "Muzei" or "Mzee", meaning respected person. All of Jamil's adult sons with the exception of Eria and Freddy (discussed at the end of this annex) left Madina with Jamil. All of Jamil's sons were military commanders, although some also held other positions in the ADF structure.

Jamil's sons

2. **Richard** aka Richard Muzei. Richard is approximately 29 years old, a stepson to Jamil, and a key ADF leader who was close to Jamil. He is the son of Mariam, one of Jamil's wives, and has a sister named Stella (see below). Richard was a teacher at Salaf Victory Primary School, instructing boys in English and Kiswahili, as well as teaching computer classes for boys and girls. Richard has two wives, Shaddya and Sumayya; he has three children with the former (his first wife), and one child with the latter. Richard is a member of the 8000.
3. **Moses** aka Moses Muzei. Moses is approximately 26 years old, married to one wife, and has no known children. Moses was involved in logistics and supplies for ADF, and he frequently signed for goods and money received at Madina camp (see annex 11). He escorted the four MSF staff kidnapped on 11-12 July 2013 from Kamango to Madina camp. Moses is a member of the 8000.



Signature of Moses from an ADF book recording receipt of goods and money at Madina camp.

4. **Isaac** aka Isaac Muzei, Hassan Nyanzi. Isaac is approximately 26 years old and married to a woman named Shakila; they had one son. Isaac's wife and son stayed with the Baluku group. Isaac had joined ADF in 2008, but left in 2010 to go to Nairobi after injuring his right eye; he now normally wears sunglasses. Kenyan authorities arrested him in 2010, and handed him over to Ugandan authorities in 2011. Isaac lived in Kampala until late 2013, when he returned to ADF with his wife and son. Isaac is a member of the 8000.
5. **Bada** aka Bada Muzei. Bada is approximately 19 years old, unmarried, and with no known children. Bada is a member of the 8000.
6. **Nane** aka Nane Muzei. Nane is approximately 20 years old, unmarried, with no known children. Nane is a member of the 8000.

7. **Nico** aka Nicholas aka Nico Muzei. Nico is approximately 18 years old, unmarried, with no known children. Nico is a member of the 8000.

Bodyguards and ADF leaders

8. **Ben** aka Benjamin, Beni, Mulefu, Jeff, Benjamin Kisokeranyo or Kisokeranio. Ben is a bodyguard and close advisor to Jamil. He drew up lists of supplies to be purchased in town. Jamil called Ben "Mulefu", meaning big man; this was a friendly joke because Ben is small in stature. Ben had two wives, one named Huala Buha, and several children. He is a member of the 8000.
9. **Mobile.** Mobile is a scout who knows the forest well, and a military instructor. He has one wife and one child. Two ADF ex-combatants and a Bazana told the Group that Mobile returned to the main ADF group led by Baluku at some point in May-June 2014. As of the writing of this report, Mobile is reportedly still in the bush with the ADF groups under the command of Baluku (annex 4).
10. **Bisasso** aka Bank Manager, Bisaso. Bisasso is the head of finance for ADF, and also a bodyguard to Jamil. His duties included tracking ADF's income and expenditures (see annex 11), and running the Baitul Mali store in Madina camp, where people could procure food items. Bisasso has three wives (Amina, Mama Twalaha, and one other) and two sons (Twalaha, approx. 7 years old; and Hanthara, approx. 11 years old). He is a member of the 8000.
11. **Kikutte** (pronounced "Chi-ku-tay") aka Dillo, Diiro, Jaja, Mukulu Kikutte. Kikutte is a bodyguard to Jamil, and a deputy Army Commander who assumed leadership of ADF's army in the absence of Hood Lukwago, the Army Commander (see annex 4). Kikutte is married to Mama Muzei, aka Mama Muzi, Mariam, Mama Yawe. Two of his sons (Albani aka Alban, Katweere; Kivumbi) died during the war in 2014. Two other sons (Abdul Salaam aka Salaami, approx. 29 years old; Yawe, approx. 11 years old) may still be alive. Kikutte is a member of the 8000.
12. **Magezi Abdul** aka Magezi Abdul Laterij, Abdul Laterij. Magezi Abdul is the assistant to Recoilance in ii, ADF's internal security. He is married to a woman named Sumayya, and has two children.



Part of an ADF mission order recovered by FARDC in April 2014 at Madina camp. The order was "Allowed by II on duty Magezi Abdul Laterij" on 18 January 2013.



From the same mission order show to the left, this part of the order shows Magezi Abdul's signature next to "Sign II".

13. **Diini** aka Superman. Diini is a bodyguard to Jamil and highly respected warrior within ADF. Diini travelled to towns such as Beni and Butembo with concealed arms, and used to escort Jamil and other important ADF leaders when they left ADF camps to go "outside". Diini has one wife and two children. He is a member of the 8000.
14. **Patero** aka Patel. Patero is a bodyguard to Jamil and military commander. Patero was commander of AKBG base in 2013. He is married with no known children. FARDC reported that Patero was killed in action; however, two ex-combatants, an ADF dependent, and a local source in Beni told the Group that Patero left in April with the Mukulu group, and had not been seen since. Patero is a member of the 8000.
15. **Kitongole** aka Abdul. Kitongole is a bodyguard to Jamil, and in his early 40s. He is married and has one daughter. He is a member of the 8000.

16. **Musubuzi**. Musubuzi is the chief of Jamil's bodyguards. He is married to Monica (see below). He is a member of the 8000.
17. **Monica** aka Afande Monica. Monica is in charge of ii (internal security) for women, in charge of the women prisoners, a military instructor for women, and a nurse. She is married to Musubuzi (see above), and the two are rarely seen apart.
18. **Wamala**. Wamala is a bodyguard to Jamil and a member of the 8000.

Jamil's wives and young children

19. **Aisha.** Aisha is a wife to Jamil, and has two young children with him.
20. **Sumayya**. Sumayya is a wife to Jamil, and has two young children with him.
21. **Mariam**. Mariam is Jamil's oldest, or first, wife. She had at least two children – Richard (see above) and Stella (see below) – with another man.
22. **Sarah** aka Sarah Muzei. Sarah is Jamil's daughter, approximately 10 years old.
23. **Stella.** Steila is daughter to Mariam, but her father is not Jamil. Richard Muzei is her brother. She is approx. 35 years old and married to Baluku.
24. **Jamil's Baby 1**.
25. **Jamil's Baby 2**.
26. **Jamil's Baby 3**.
27. **Jamil's Baby 4**.
28. **Baluku's Baby 1**. Mother is Stella.
29. **Baluku's Baby 2**. Mother is Stella.

Bazana

The Bazana, or Muzana (singular), were people captured by ADF, usually from communities near ADF territory (see annex 7). Multiple sources including a Bazana told the Group at least two Bazana (teenage girls) left with Jamil's group.

30. Priska

31. Judith or Judit

Other family members who did not leave Madina with Jamil

In addition to the family members mentioned above, at least three close relations did not leave Madina camp with the Jamil Mukulu group. One son, **Freddy** aka Freddy Muzei, who was approx. 20 years old, died in combat in 2014. He left behind two wives, Sumayya and Grace. A second son, **Eria** aka Eria Muzei or Eric, had been wounded in combat and was recovering at Madina when Jamil Mukulu left. Eria remains in the bush under the command of Baluku, and as of October, was in command of a smaller group of ADF dependents of important commanders. One daughter, **Sophia** aka Sophi, stayed with the Baluku group. She is approx. 31 years old, divorced from Baluku, and had children with Baluku. One source told the Group she left the bush and successfully travelled to Goma (para. 32).

ADF leaders in the Mukulu group



Jamil Mukulu

Ben

Kikutte

Richard Muzei

Image showing the relative sizes of **Lukwago** (left), **Richard** (center), and **Jamil Mukulu** (right).



Isaac Muzei. The Ugandan identity card on the right was recovered in April 2014 at Madina camp by FARDC, showing Isaac's name as **Hassan Nyanzi**.

Patero

Images obtained from MONUSCO; still images from videos obtained by the Group; ID card photo by the Group of Experts.

Annex 4

ADF Baluku group

Seka Baluku leads the ADF group still active northeast of Beni town as of November 2014. Baluku split his group in several smaller groups; however, he retains overall command and control. The following is a list of important commanders believed to be still alive and with the Baluku group. The list is compiled from information provided by nine ADF ex-combatants, dependents, and Bazana; a source in Beni; and documents recovered by the Group and FARDC at Madina camp. The photos (at end) are from MONUSCO and open source material.

Military Commanders

1. **Seka Baluku** aka Musa, Lumu, Lumonde, Baluku. Since mid-April 2014, Baluku has the overall commander of the ADF group operating northeast of Beni town. He is married to Jamil Mukulu's daughter Stella, who is with the Jamil Mukulu group along with their children. Baluku is divorced from Mukulu's daughter Sophia, and from Mama Mayaya (a member of the 8000). Baluku has two daughters from his marriage with Mama Mayaya. He is a member of the 8000.
2. **Lukwago** aka Hood, Huudu, London, PL, Piero, Army Commander, David Lukwago. Lukwago is ADF's overall Army Commander. He has four wives, and at least three children. Two young men – Rachid Lukwago and Muhindo Lukwago – who lived with Lukwago in Madina camp, but were not his sons, also used his name. His brother Magezi is also in ADF; Magezi's son and Lukwago's nephew is called Musa Lukwago. He is a member of the 8000.
3. **Fezza** aka Feeza, Mulalo, Elias Segujja. Fezza is a senior military commander. His popularity with ADF's soldiers produced the nickname "Mulalo", a version of the word morale. Fezza was the overall commander of the 26 December 2013 attack on Kamango, which ADF considered the start of the FARDC-ADF war, according to ex-combatants interviewed by the Group. He is married to Zwad, aka Mama Zwad, and has a son. He is a member of the 8000.
4. **Muzzanganda** aka BD, Armorer Man, Armorer, Jamil. Muzzanganda is in charge of ADF's weaponry, and was one of its primary bomb-makers during 2013-14. He has a wife and a son. He is a member of the 8000.
5. **Adam**. Adam was an assistant to Muzzanganda, and helped him to make improvised explosive devices.
6. **Eria** aka Eric, Fanta. Eria is one of Jamil Mukulu's sons, who had been injured in combat in early 2014 and was left at Madina when Mukulu left. By September he had recovered from his wounds and was in charge of the wives and children of key ADF commanders. He is a member of the 8000.
7. **Nasser** aka Nassa, Mayor. Nasser took over as CCO (Chief of Combat Operations) in early 2014, following the death of Philippo, the previous CCO. He is married to Soki, with whom he has several children.
8. **Seka Katende**, aka Kabila, Sheikh Katende. Seka Katende is a military commander, but also one of the most important Islamic leaders in ADF. He was the Imam at the Obedi Mosque in Madina camp, which was Mukulu's mosque where only members of the 8000 and their children could meet and worship. Seka Katende is also a judge, and director of the committee that addresses marriage disputes. Seka Katende makes the final decision in divorce cases, although Seka Baluku also finalized some divorces. He is married to Rachida, and they have one boy and one girl. He is a member of the 8000.
9. **Canada** aka Kibuye. Canada is a military commander who had previously been the commander of Camp Canada aka JNBG camp. He is a member of the 8000.

10. **Werason** aka Werrason. Werason is a senior ADF commander who was overall commander of ADF's Commander Ibrahim Battle Group (CIBG) base. Werason was also a military instructor at CIBG, where he trained adult men and boys under the age of eighteen. He has two wives, one of whom is Safiina Abbasi, the daughter of Abbas Sekamate, who joined ADF in 2013 after bringing his children from the UK. Werason has at least one son and one daughter.
11. **Rafiki**. Rafiki joined ADF in approximately 1995, when he was a young boy. Rafiki's father was a member of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), but after ADF and NALU split, Rafiki became Muslim and joined ADF. Rafiki became a commander, and was one of the principal military instructors at CIBG camp, where he trained many male children in addition to adult males. He is approximately 23 years old.
12. **Amigo** aka Simba Amigo, Mzee Amigo. Amigo is a military commander. In 2009, he commanded the ADF base at Irungu (disbanded in 2012), where military training took place. Amigo took part in the 26 December 2013 attack on Kamango. In May, after leaving Madina, Baluku sent Amigo and approximately two-dozen ADF soldiers to the Oicha-Eringeti area. On 30 or 31 May, Amigo led a successful ambush against FARDC soldiers traveling on the road east of Eringeti, which netted ADF tens of thousands of dollars in FARDC salaries (see para. 37). Amigo later re-joined the Baluku group. He is a member of the 8000.
13. **Rambo**. Rambo is a military commander of Congolese nationality, who knows the forest well. FARDC told the Group that Rambo was killed in action; however, six ex-combatants who left ADF between June and September told the Group that Rambo was still alive and with the Baluku group.
14. **Toyo** aka Toyota. Toyo is a military commander who left the Baluku group with Amigo, but later returned. He has provided military training to newcomers in 2014.
15. **Maraba**. Maraba is assistant CCO to Nasser, and a commander of one of the ADF groups under the overall command of Baluku.
16. **Braida**. Braida is a military commander who, prior to leaving Madina, had also been in charge of getting food for ADF from the forest and nearby communities.
17. **Kalume** aka Amisi Kasadha, Muzamir Kirbaki, Dr. Kalume. Kalume is a deputy Army Commander and a military instructor who has trained child soldiers. He is also a medical doctor.
18. **Kabode**. Kabode is in his early 40s, and was involved in the first attack on Kamango, 13-14 July 2014, during which ADF looted the hospital and kidnapped four MSF staff (S/2014/42, paras. 82-87).
19. **Kasibante** aka Defender, OC. Kasibante is a military commander who has been in charge of prisoners for the Baluku group. He has at least one wife, who is a Bazana.
20. **Mobile.** Mobile left Madina camp with the Mukulu group (annex 3), but joined Baluku's group sometime in May-June, and remained there through at last October.

Non-military

21. **Recoilance** aka Rekoilenci, Ricoilens. Recoilance is in charge of ii, ADF's internal security service. He also taught Social Studies to boys in the Salaf Victory Primary School.
22. **Sentongo** aka Waswa, PC Sentongo, Setongo. Sentongo is ADF's police commissioner, who works within the ii department. He is also a Sheikh. He is disabled due to an accident, and walks with crutches.
23. **Seka Musa** aka Sheikh Musa, Musa Nsambo. Seka Musa is in charge of Islamic education for ADF. He is disabled from birth, and walks using his hands.
24. **Senga** aka Mama Nasim. Senga, a woman in her 40s, is in charge of all women in ADF, including prisoners. Senga arranges marriages between ADF men and women, including Bazana. Senga is also part of the group that mediated marriage disputes (along with Seka Katende and Mama Bushira).
25. **Mwanje**. Mwanje is the deputy chief of finance for ADF, who works under Bisasso (see annex 3).

26. **Lumisa** aka Muhamad, Dr. Lumisa. Lumisa is a sheikh and medical doctor, approximately 54 years old, who joined ADF in 1999. Prior to leaving Madina camp with the Baluku group, Lumisa had been in charge of Welfare, a store in Madina camp where people could get boots, jerry cans, and other non-food items. After leaving Madina, Lumisa was in charge of the care of the wounded. He has two wives and at least two children, including one called "X", a son who is an ADF soldier.
27. **Guti** aka Muti, Dr. Guti. Guti is one of the key medical doctors for ADF.
28. **Nanyonyo Nuuru** aka Nuuru, Nuur Nanyonyo, Musawo Nuuru. Nanyonyo Nuuru is a nurse and long-term ADF member whose husband was an ADF soldier who died in 1999. She had two sons who were ADF soldiers, one of whom died in combat. Jamil Mukulu punished her in December 2013 for mentioning that one of Mukulu's wives had given birth to a daughter (see annex 7).

Commanders and other leaders in the Baluku group



Images from MONUSCO; still images from videos obtained by the Group of Experts.

Annex 5

ADF fighters in October 2010

The following images show documents, recovered by FARDC in April 2014 in Madina camp, listing ADF soldiers as of October 2010. The title reads: "Fighting Forces" (Amaje Amalwanyi). From a force of 110 soldiers and commanders, including child soldiers, ADF rebuilt itself to 400-500 soldiers and commanders by 2014.

The list below includes notable ADF still active in 2014 including Kabody (1), Musubuzi (7), Toyo aka Toyota (23), Moses (25), Adam (41), Isaac (42), Richard Mzei (43), Eria (44), Diini (56), Rambo (63), Sh. Twaib (64), Nassa (71), Sony (72), Mzei Mwaje (75), Mzei Nowe (76), Kitongole (78), Mzei Feza (81), Odongo (82), Mzei London (84), Mzei BD (88), Mzei Patel (89), Mzei Kibuye (95), Dr. Moize (97), Lukwago (104), Katunji (105), and Reocoilens (106).



Annex 6

Summary of ADF interviews

The following table summarizes the Group of Experts' interviews with 42 ADF members and two recruits between April-October 2014. These people escaped, surrendered, or were captured between June and September 2014, with the exception of one man captured in February 2014. The "Role in ADF" column identifies Bazana, who are abductees treated as slaves (annex 7). The designation "Civilian" includes women and children; however, most women and children 13 years and older received military training (para. 31).

Nationality	Gender	Year recruited	Role in ADF	ADF has links to terrorist groups	Confirmed use of child soldiers by ADF	Had family in ADF
Uganda- 34 DRC - 9 Burundi - 1	F - 14 M - 30	2014 - 10 2013 - 12 2012 - 8 2011 - 4 2010 - 4 2009 - 2 Early 2000s - 1 Unknown - 3	Soldier - 25 Child soldier - 6 Commander - 2 Recruit - 2 Civilian- 11 Bazana - 4 Network - 1	No – 11 Yes – 0	25	**Had family members in ADF when joined** - 7 **Joined along with family** - 8

In addition to the above-mentioned ADF members and recruits, the Group interviewed the following:

- One woman whose children had been recruited by ADF;
- One woman liberated by FARDC during an abduction attempt by ADF in 2013;
- One woman who may have been kidnapped by ADF, but whose story had inconsistencies that put her testimony in doubt;
- Three women the Group believes were falsely claiming to have been kidnapped by ADF;
- One man the Group believes is falsely claiming to have been a senior ADF commander; and
- One man who is mentally ill, but was imprisoned for allegedly being an ADF member.

The Group also interviewed local sources in Beni and Oicha, MONUSCO staff, FARDC officers, and ANR officials.

Annex 7

Bazana

The Bazana (meaning roughly *slaves taken during a war* in Luganda; singular is Muzana) were people kidnapped from the periphery of ADF's area of control who became the personal property of Jamil Mukulu. Most of the Bazana were women who had been abducted while working in their fields or traveling on paths or roads; many were abducted with one or more of their children. The four MSF staff (one Congolese woman and three Congolese men) abducted by ADF in July 2013 were kept as Bazana. During late 2013 and early 2014, there were approximately 60 Bazana at Madina camp, separated by sex; there were only approximately six men and the rest were women and children. The Bazana were forced to convert to Islam (para. 137).

Bazana and general prisoners stayed in a central prison in Madina camp, which had separate sections for men and women. The prison had above ground rooms and underground cells, where serious offenders were kept (S/2014/428, annex 10), as well as pits in the ground outside the prison.

The female Bazana were required to work in various tasks around Madina camp, and were forced to marry ADF men, including Jamil Mukulu (para. 139). The female Bazana wore distinctive outfits, as shown in the photos below. The orange stripe on the hood denoted them as Bazana.

Bazana outfits worn by women who escaped from ADF in August 2014. Photos by FARDC.

Annex 8

ADF camps

Recent camps

ADF camps used during 2013-14 include:

- **Madina** (aka Madinat Tawheed Muwaheedina or MTM). Madina camp is the former Makayoba 3 camp. Until mid-April 2014, Madina was ADF's main camp, where leader Jamil Mukulu and his family lived; Mukulu was also the commander of Madina camp. Madina had ADF's main hospital, numerous mosques and zones, an orphanage, the Salaf Victory Primary School, and ADF's armory, which was under the control of Muzzanganda. ADF's courts convened at Madina camp, and women and children received military training at Madina. A large open area shown in many ADF videos was called "risala", and was used to gather people for Islamic instruction; people were also publicly punished at risala. Madina likely had a population of around 1,000 in January 2014. Prior to being an ADF camp, a village called Nadui was in this location.
- **CIBG.** CIBG stands for Commander Ibrahim Battle Group (named after a dead ADF commander), and is the former Makayoba 2 camp. Werason was the commander. CIBG was ADF's main training camp, where men and boys were trained.
- **Canada** (aka JNBG). Canada is the former Makayoba 1 camp; JNBG stands for JN Battle Group. The Group could not determine the meaning of JN, but believes it is the initials of a dead commander. Canada (aka Kibuye) was commander of Canada camp.
- **AKBG.** AKBG was a new camp, constructed in 2013, and approximately two kilometers north of Madina camp. AKBG stands for AK Battle Group; the Group could not determine the meaning of AK, but believes it is the initials of a dead commander. Patero was commander in 2013, and Mumbere was commander in 2014. This was a small camp, numbering fewer than 100 residents, but was the transit camp for the Baluku group after they evacuated Madina in April 2014.
- **Saa Sita Saa.** Saa Sita Saa was both a village and an ADF camp. Musana was the commander prior to the war.
- **Kabira.** Kabira camp (erroneously called Kabila camp in the Group's midterm report, S/2014/428, paras. 11, 31 and annex 3) is less than 1 km from the Mbau-Kamango road near PK40. Kabira was a gateway to Madina camp, but also played an important role as a forward base for ADF during early 2014. Various men commanded Kabira including Fezza and Kikutte. ADF had motorcycles at Kabira that it used to go to east to Kamango, or west to Beni or Oicha.
- **Masereka.** This was a small camp used as a transit camp for goods going from RVs on the Mbau-Kamango road to Madina camp. Masereka was the commander, and few soldiers were permanently stationed there.
- **Kisiki.** This was a small camp close to an RV on the Mbau-Oicha road, near the village of Kisiki, which was used as a collection and transit point for goods arriving at the RV. Nabweyo was the commander until early 2014 when ADF leaders ordered the position abandoned.

ADF also had numerous smaller positions, including at **PK25** (aka Mamundioma, located 25 km from Mbau on the Mbau-Kamango road), **PK40** (aka Ambush 1, located 40 km from Mbau on the Mbau-Kamango road; this was the main trailhead to Kabira and Madina camps), **Semliki Bridge** (aka Ambush 2, on the Mbau-Kamango road), **Ambush 3** (between Semliki Bridge and Kamango), and **Jericho**.

Former camps

In 2010, during Operation Rwenzori (called Kuminattaano or "Fifteen" by ADF), ADF moved to former camps to hide from FARDC. Ex-combatants have told the Group that ADF leaders may use former camps to hide or regroup; therefore, it is useful to know the names and locations of these former camps, in the event ADF has returned to these camps. Former camps include:

- **Chuchubo** (aka Madina). Chuchubo was called Madina prior to the 2010 war, and was ADF's headquarters camp. In 2011, ADF abandoned Chuchubo, but applied the name Madina to its new headquarters camp, described above.
- **Irungu.** This camp is in the Mutwanga area, and was disbanded in 2012. Amigo was the commander. This camp was used for training, and as a transit point for recruits coming through the Bwera-Kasindi border crossing.
- **Mujadala.** This camp was used to train commanders in 2011-2012.
- **Mashauri**. This is an old ADF camp, closed for some years, far from Madina camp, and named after a dead commander.
- **Jafali**. This camp closed during the 2010 war, and was near Chuchubo.
- **Kasacha**. This camp closed in 2005.

Annex 9

ADF courts and internal security

ADF has a legal system consisting of two courts, and an internal security apparatus that monitors the population and enforces the courts' decisions. The legal system is not codified, but based on the Koran and the individual decision making of Jamil Mukulu and other judges. One ADF ex-combatant who was arrested in August 2014 told the Group that by August, ADF's courts were no longer functioning as they had been before the war.

Courts

ADF has two courts: Court A and Court C. Court A is the lower, or general court. Seka Baluku is the head of Court A, which would convene as needed, when people were accused of a crime. Four to five judges, all senior ADF leaders, listen to the presentation of the charge and issue a judgment. Court C is Jamil Mukulu's court, where he adjudicates serious cases, including military misconduct, or infractions that were of particular interest to him. Mukulu is the chief judge for all of ADF, and for Court C, although other ADF leaders sometimes advise him. In December 2013, Jamil Mukulu threatened to take Dr. Nuuru, aka Nanyoro Nuuru, to Court C for "rumor mongering" (see "Rumor accusation" note, below). The letter mentions Aisha Abbas, who was one of Jamil Mukulu's wives; it is not clear if Mukulu divorced her or if they are still married. One ADF ex-combatant told the Group that Dr. Nuuru received 200 lashes for uttering ten words (20 lashes per word) about the birth of Mukulu's daughter.

Punishments varied according to the crime:

- **Petty theft**. Three ex-ADF members told the Group that the punishment for petty theft is the loss of one hand. One woman told the Group that Baluku ordered her hand cut off because she was convicted of taking a flashlight that was not hers.
- **Rape**. ADF leaders did not tolerate rape (although ADF practiced forced marriage; see para. 132), and punished offenders by cutting off one hand and one foot.
- **Adultery**. Married individuals who committed adultery were sentenced to death by stoning; ADF leaders required people in Madina camp to throw one stone each at the offender until the person was dead. Unmarried individuals convicted of adultery would be killed.
- **Escape**. People caught trying to escape were generally sentenced to death and killed by either slitting the throat or crucifixion.
- **Prohibited speech**. Prohibited speech generated punishments including jail time, having one's mouth sewn shut, and being beaten with a stick (see "Prohibited speech" note, below).
- **Failure to convert to Islam**. This was punishable by death.
- **Failure to undergo military training**. People who refused military training were put in prison until they consented; such consent was usually coerced through death threats.

Other punishments included time in a pit (see "Jamil's warning" note, below), or time in the "Iron Maiden" (S/2014/428, annex 10).



[First word is not completely visible but appears to be: Authority has been given] to investigate about what is being said that Dr. Nuur spread a rumor on 6 Dec 2013 when she told the ladies who were keeping watch at Masjid Obed that "I had been there to help Aisha Abbas to deliver a baby daughter".

If there is evidence, she should be taken to Court C and be given a punishment for rumor mongering, by being whipped 20 times for every word [she said].

Rumor accusation (above). Letter recovered by FARDC in April 2014 at Madina camp.



Haina ii

Final Warning

If it happens again that students arrive at the Q/grds [Quarter guard], and there is no ii to search them, I will put all of you in the pit and you will spend there 3 days, as well as whipping each of you 50 times.

That is whether it is in the morning or in the evening. I am angry with the way you are doing things. You are denying, you are misleading, you are bothering, you are torturing people at the Q/grds where they spend hours begging for mercy, you are nowhere to be seen, people go to the extent of spending a night at the Q/grd and you are nowhere to be seen.

Those at the Q/grd appeal to you, calling you over the radio and you are nowhere to be seen.

Please, do not make me unleash my anger on you.

MAKE THE CHANGES NOW.

Jamil

13/11/13

Jamil's warning (above). Letter recovered by FARDC in April 2014 at Madina camp.



1/12/20..

I have received information from.... I am going to be jailed for 2 years and I will get 10 whips every day for 2 months. All this is because it is alleged that I said that it was unfair to jail and whip Lumiisa a Muslim. I pray that God be the judge in these allegations. It is true I said what I said. God is the true judge.

Prohibited speech (above). Excerpt from a book recovered by FARDC in April 2014 at Madina camp.

Internal Security and Corrections

ADF's internal security force is called the "ii" ("II") department. Before ADF divided its leadership in April 2014, Recoilance (aka Rikoilenci) was head of ii, and his deputy was Magezi Abdul. Monica was the ii agent in charge of monitoring ADF's women, and in charge of the female ii agents. Monica was married to Musubuzi, who was Jamil Mukulu's chief bodyguard (annex 3). Sentongo (aka Waswa, PC Sentongo) was the head of ADF's police force (annex 4), which was administratively within the ii department. Kasibante (aka Defender) was in charge of the prison.

The ii has several functions, including patrolling inside ADF camps; checking people leaving and entering ADF camps at locations called "Quarter guard"; authorizing travel outside camps or between camps; identifying and investigating legal infractions; enforcing punishments; and running ADF's prison system. The ii department had its own stamp, which was imprinted on travel orders (annex 3; S/2014/428, annex 9). Many of the ii agents used for patrols and guard duty were women.

II records showing assignments in Madina camp during 11-13 July 2013. ADF attacked Kamango on 11-12 July. Quarter G is the quarter guard; Amura is the Armory; Kiro means night; Misaana means day; Abatambudde means those who have travelled (to or from Madina).

Annex 10

ADF's society of the 8000

ADF had a society of elders and elite leaders called the 8000, or Kanana in the Luganda language. Jamil Mukulu selected people for inclusion in the 8000, but it generally consisted of people who had been in ADF for a long time, or were close to Mukulu, such as his adult sons. The 8000 met and prayed at Masjid (Mosque) Obedi in Madina camp;[27] family members of the 8000 could also pray there. Seka Katende was the Imam at Obedi mosque. This information comes from ADF ex-combatants, a source in Beni, and several documents recovered in Madina camp. Many members of the 8000 are currently with the Baluku or Mukulu groups (annexes 3, 4). The living members (as of October 2014) of the 8000 include:

1. Jamil Mukulu	19. Muzzanganda
2. Isaac Muzei (Jamil's son)	20. Katusa
3. Richard Muzei (Jamil's stepson)	21. Katonji
4. Moses Muzei (Jamil's son)	22. Kikutte
5. Bada Muzei (Jamil's son)	23. Bisasso
6. Nico Muzei (Jamil's son)	24. Katchira
7. Nane Muzei (Jamil's son)	25. Uthuman
8. Eria Muzei (Jamil's son)	26. Baluku
9. Sharif aka Falcon Wamala	27. Lukwago
10. Hadaad	28. Fezza
11. Mama Dayana	29. Mama Luka
12. Patero	30. Katende
13. Kiswiriri	31. Senga (Mama Senga)
14. Benjamin Kisokeranyo	32. Kabody
15. Musubuzi	33. Mama Mayaya
16. Amigo	34. Butambala
17. Diini	35. Jeewe
18. Canada (Kibuye)	36. Kitongole

[27] Other mosques in Madina camp included Wenge, Tiger, Headquarters, Kigozi, Swaibu, and Barau.

Annex 11

ADF recruitment

Map created by MONUSCO GIS for the Group of Experts, November 2014.



This map shows the areas of ADF recruitment and the routes of human transit and human trafficking,[28] based on Group of Experts' interviews with 44 ADF ex-combatants, civilians, and prisoners who escaped,

[28] The transport of people recruited through the "threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability" meets the definition of human trafficking under article 3(a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons; however, since some recruits voluntarily joined ADF, the term does not apply to the movement of all recruits. Nonetheless, it is clear that ADF has engaged in human trafficking.

surrendered, or were captured between February and October 2014. The shaded (red) districts in Uganda represent where people were recruited; in some cases people were recruited in districts other than their home district. The black lines with arrows represent initial transit and trafficking routes to main transit towns of Kampala, Uganda, and Goma, DRC. The thicker red lines with arrows represent the main routes from Kampala and Goma.

Ugandan recruits came from 12 districts: Busia (4 people), Jinja (3), Kampala, including Wakiso (3), Mbale (3), Iganga (2), Bugiri (1), Hoima (1), Kisoro (1), Mukono (1), Namutumba (1), Ntungamo (1), and Pallisa (1). With the exception of the recruit from Kisoro, all Ugandan recruits passed through Kampala. From Kampala, the most common trafficking route was via Bwera-Kasindi (16), Goma (6), and Bundibugyo-Kamango (1); the others were not sure or did not report their transit route. Those who passed through Bwera-Kasindi usually went to Beni first, and then to ADF camps. Those who passed through Goma passed through Butembo and Beni, and then to ADF. The one person who crossed at Bundibugyo-Kamango went directly to an ADF camp.

Most Congolese in ADF came from Goma; however, some came from Uvira and Bukavu. Uvira and Bukavu recruits went to Goma, from where ADF recruits went to Butembo, Beni, and finally to the bush. The one Burundian recruit interviewed by the Group travelled to Bukavu, then Goma, and then Butembo and Beni.

ADF recorded the arrival of new recruits (called "newcomers" or N/C) and noted money and identification cards they brought with them. The following images are from a document recovered in April 2014 by FARDC in Madina camp;[29] the Group organized the translation. Fura, mentioned in the document, is an alliteration of Francs, the Congolese currency (900 Francs = $1 in November 2014).

Money from newcomers (N/C) received by Moses Mzei on 1 March 2013

1. Uthuman Nibishake 500 Francs
2. Muhindo Kingala Biribati $40 7100 Francs & ID
3. Fikiiri Yenga Yenga Kamaate $50 6750 Francs & ID
4. Muhindo Nyantore 3350 Francs
5. Umar Kambaale 900 Francs
6. Nzasingi Zimaana Ibrahim 500 Francs
7. Kanyere Salima Zainabu 1000 Francs & ID
8. Chakimwa Vakutusuraki Jeanine 3950 Francs & ID

Moses sign:
Moses Muzei
01/03/2013 (signed)

[29] The Group could not identify any of these names on lists of people allegedly abducted by ADF between 2011-2014.

Annex 12

ADF material support network

ADF has an extensive support network in DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. FARDC recovered documents in April 2014 at Madina camp that include names of ADF operatives and lists items brought to Madina camp from ADF's network. The Group organized translation of some of these the documents from Luganda, Kiswahili, and Arabic.

Document	Translation
	Beni see Kaberebere : Kbr Avion [plane] : Bata Goma : see Soli Gisenyi [Rwanda] : Zayi (will tell you to see Zai) The man in Gisenyi is called Abdurazale.
	[The opposite side of the sheet shown above contained the name of Okapi]: 0973768751 OKAPI 29 March 2013 (reversed)
	[Items brought by Okapi on 23 November 2012]: RV NGA 23/11/12 u/Sh: OKAPI - Smoked fish - Machete - Salt - Peanuts - 4 Nokia phones model 1280 - 75,900 Francs & Sim Card (4)
	Beni See Rehma Bambire Katungu

The following table summarizes information contained in a book recovered by FARDC in April 2014 at ADF's Madina Camp, which the Group reviewed. This is not intended to be a complete record of all receipts of money and goods by ADF, but indicates the frequency of deliveries, commander's names, the number of people who carried goods, money received, and other goods delivered to ADF. The money identified may in some cases be deliveries from external sources, but in other cases may represent the balance left over from the purchase of goods. Most deliveries consisted largely of food, but also clothes, medicine, and basic goods such as soap and toothpaste. The table summarizes deliveries between 28 February and 9 March 2013 (six deliveries in ten days), and between 14 and 27 August 2012 (eight deliveries in 14 days).

Date (RV name if identified)	Commander of RV mission	Number of people in RV party	Money received (in US$ or DRC francs, as identified in original)	Non-food/medicine/clothes items received
9 Mar. 2013	Sheikh Nowe	11	$1,526	- Nokia phone (1) - ID card (1)
7 Mar. 2013	Sukusa	19	$10	- Nokia phone (1) - ID card (2) - Flashlight (2)
3 Mar. 2013	Umar Mujuni	10	$105 2,700 Fr	- People (2) - ID cards (2)
2 Mar. 2013	Not identified	4	906,200 Fr	- Letters from outside
1 Mar. 2013	Setuka Moses	Not identified	$90 23,250 Fr	- People (8) - ID cards (4)
28 Feb. 2013	1. Toyo (Toyota) Abdullah 2. Muusa Kiyingi 3. Musana Abdul Hamidu	17	100,300 Fr	
27 Aug. 2012 (Bakomyewo)	Mabuka	6	0	
23 Aug. 2012 (Nga)	Sheikh Nowe	5	0	
23 Aug. 2012 (Nga)	Moses Mukaire Waffe	11	0	- Phone (1) - Battery
17 Aug. 2012 (Nga)	Nomi	66	$46 571,350 Fr	- Goats (10) - Letters (3)
17 Aug. 2012 (Nga)	Mbale	10	$1,249 762,400 Fr (Money received by Bisasso)	- Motorola batteries (3) - Prayer books (3) - Batteries
15 Aug. 2012 (Nga)	Masereka	3	$713 153,150 Fr	- People - Phones (8) - SIM cards - Driver's permit (1) - ID cards (4, incl. 1 Uganda, 1 DRC) - Acid (1 liter) - Batteries
15 Aug. 2012 (Nga)	Sony	11	20,000 Fr	- Petrol - ID card (1) - Phone (1), Nokia - SIM cards (2)
14 Aug. 2012 (Nga)	Mukaire Waffe	42	0	- Batteries

S/2015/19



RV NGA 15/8/012

1. Comm. Sony

- Petrol 4 jerry cans
- Beans 24 Kgs
- Rice 25 Kgs
- Dried salted fish 9 Kgs
- Smoked Nile Perch 4
- Panasonic flash light batteries 2 Boxes
- Wheat Flour 4
- Nokia Phone

2. Zilizomuva

- Cooking oil 5 Liters (Zilizomuva)
- Beans 3.5
- Ndoloyi obupungo [unknown] 10
- Nokia Phone
- Onions 4
- Dried fish 5
- Sleeping Baby [petroleum jelly] 1 Tin
- Irish potatoes 1 Kg
- Cooking oil 5 Liters (Masereka)

List of goods received from 15 August 2012 RV at Nga. It is likely the two people identified here were in charge of porterage groups, considering the volume of goods identified.



Log book entry for supplies and money received on 7 August 2012. This entry is significant because it shows that Bisasso, ADF's chief of finance, received the money, including $1,249.



3 March [2013]

Money from the Newcomers (N/C) delivered to Moses Mzei

1) Fatume Munyaliro Edisar
ID $105 2700 Francs (Fura)

2) Nyirandozi Maana Siifa Pelagi
ID

Moses Sign

(Moses signature)

Annex 13

Western Union transfers to ADF agents

This annex provides information about money transfers from London, England to ADF agents in DRC. In April 2014, FARDC recovered a document in ADF's Madina camp that included references to two Western Union (WU) money transfers by Aisha Namutebi from London. UK authorities have confirmed to the Group of Experts that Aisha Namutebi is a naturalized UK citizen of Ugandan origin who lives in London.



Document recovered by FARDC in April 2014 at Madina camp. The image on left is from the upper right hand corner of the image on the right.

Data provided by Western Union enabled the Group to determine that Aisha Namutebi sent money to Estha Furaha Bulabula and Yusufu Shabani Majuto, two suspected ADF agents. Ms. Namutebi sent $1,500 to Ms. Bulabula in three transfers. Ms. Bulabula used two locations in Goma on the same day to receive two of the transfers.

Western Union transfers to Estha Furaha Bulabula

Sender Name	WU Send location (In London, England)	WU Receipt location (In DRC)	Pay Date	Amount Paid (US$)
Aisha Namutebi	Daneburys Convenience Store, SW15 45Q (Agent AUK136332)	Planete, **Goma** (Agent AZJ021614)	3 Apr 2013	**500**
Aisha Namutebi	Daneburys Convenience Store, SW15 45Q (Agent AUK136332)	Sake, Croissement Sake et L'entrée, **Goma** (Agent AZJ020910)	3 Apr 2013	**500**
Aishah Namutebi	Daneburys Convenience Store, SW15 45Q (Agent AUK136332)	Planete, **Goma** (Agent AZJ021614)	15 Apr 2013	**500**
TOTAL				**$1,500**

Between June 2013 and June 2014, Mr. Shabani received 21 money transfers from people using 17 different names and 11 send locations, for a total of $13,470.84. The UK Home Office have informed the Group they have "no trace" of these 17 senders on the basis of the bio-data supplied. Western Union has informed the

Group that transfers from the UK in excess of 600 pounds sterling ($960 on 31 Oct 2014 at 1 £ = $1.60) require the sender to show identification. All 21 transfers to Yusufu Shabani Majuto were less than 600 pounds; thus the senders did not have to show identification.

Western Union transfers to Yusufu Shabani Majuto (aka Yusuf Shabani Majuto)

Sender Name	WU Send location (In London, England)	WU Receipt location (In DRC)	Pay Date	Amount Paid (US$)
Aisha Namutebi	Daneburys Convenience Store, SW15 45Q (Agent AUK136332)	BIC Bank, **Goma** (Agent AZJ030139)	14 Jun 2013	**445.37**
Moses Wimbi	Market Parade Grocers, SE25 4PP (Agent AUK285261)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	10 Oct 2013	**900.00**
Addy Katto	Cashcount Convenience Store, SW6 5UA (Agent AUK252557)	BCDC Bank, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ010207)	12 Feb 2014	**200.00**
Akka Majuto	Southwest Six Cosmetics, SW6 1JT (Agent AUK352305)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	12 Feb 2014	**800.00**
David Akilimali	Pak Money Transfer Ltd., E7 0NF (Agent AUK553694)	BCDC Bank, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ010207)	12 Feb 2014	**43.75**
Moses Wimbi	Market Parade Grocers, SE25 4PP (Agent AUK285261)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	12 Feb 2014	**726.42**
Njake Amaami	Southwest Six Cosmetics, SW6 1JT (Agent AUK352305)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	21 Feb 2014	**750.00**
Ali Majuto	Afrostar Travel And Money Exch. SW6 1NN (Agent AUK535731)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	6 Mar 2014	**750.00**
Ali Majuto	Afrostar Travel And Money Exch. SW6 1NN (Agent AUK535731)	BIC Bank, **Goma** (Agent AZJ030139)	8 Mar 2014	**800.00**
Andrew Majuto	Afrostar Travel And Money Exch. SW6 1NN (Agent AUK535731)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	13 Mar 2014	**940.00**
James Mbalela	The Money Shop, N18 2JB (Agent AUK119634)	5 Ave. Matoke **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	13 Mar 2014	**660.00**
James Wimbi	Market Parade Grocers, SE25 4PP (Agent AUK285261)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	19 Mar 2014	**662.00**
Amirat Saabani	Southwest Six Cosmetics, SW6 1JT (Agent AUK352305)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	19 Apr 2014	**600.00**
Hamaan Majuto	The Money Shop, N7 6BH (Agent AUK343396)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	23 Apr 2014	**800.00**
Amira Alina	Mobile Communication, SW6 7SR (Agent AUK390419)	5 Ave. Matoke **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	26 Apr 2014	**200.00**
Abula Jorgo	Mobile Communication, SW6 7SR (Agent AUK390419)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	26 May 2014	**93.30**
Saleh Majuto	Mobile Communication, SW6 7SR (Agent AUK390419)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	17 Jun 2014	**500.00**
Alemu Ndengu	Afrostar Travel And Money Exch. SW6 1NN (Agent AUK535731)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	20 Jun 2014	**950.00**
Aliya Shabani	Afrostar Travel And Money Exch. SW6 1NN (Agent AUK535731)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	24 Jun 2014	**800.00**
Moses Sango	First Exchange Ltd, SW16 6EG (Agent AUK779908)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	25 Jun 2014	**900.00**
James Wimbi	Interservices SW9 8QH (Agent AUK386614)	5 Ave. Matoke, **Butembo** (Agent AZJ020471)	27 Jun 2014	**950.00**
TOTAL				**$13470.84**

Annex 14

Chronicle of an ADF agent

In April 2014, FARDC recovered documents in ADF's Madina camp that provide information about the travels and activities of ADF agent Estha Furaha Bulabula (aka Furaha Bwabura). The Group confirmed information contained in these documents with evidence received from Cetraca Air Service (CAS) and Western Union. Documents 1-8 are from Madina camp, and documents 9-12 are from CAS. The relevant Figures are referenced after each statement.

The documents give insight into the functioning of an ADF agent. Ms. Bulabula kept a detailed account of her expenditures and incomes, which she (or someone else) carried back to ADF's Madina camp. Between 30 March and 15 April 2013 (17 days), she recorded seven trips to Western Union locations in Goma. Of the $5,540 she received by Western Union and other means, she paid out $3,600 to three or four individuals, transferred $200 to one individual, and paid $385 to ship a bundle of goods by plane. She traveled to Gisenyi, Rwanda on one occasion, and traveled to one of Goma's border crossings with Gisenyi on another location.

The following is a summary of information from the subsequent documents:

- On **28 March 2013**, Ms. Bulabula received three different sums of money: $3,600, $340, and 1,500 Francs ($1.50) (Fig. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8).
- On **29 March**, she purchased a plane ticket from CAS for $220 to fly from Beni to Goma, paid the Go Pass tax, and completed the flight (Fig. 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 12). She paid taxes at the airport in Goma upon her arrival (Fig. 1, 5, 8).
- On **30 March**, she paid $3,000 to Kaka, and $100 to Omar (Fig. 4, 7). She also made two trips to Western Union (Fig. 1, 6, 8).
- On **31 March**, she visited Western Union in Goma and paid $5 to transfer $200 to Hassan (Fig. 1, 4, 5). Western Union has no record of a money transfer by Estha Furaha Bulabula from Goma on this day. She traveled to the border with Gisenyi, Rwanda, entered Rwanda, and returned to Goma the same day (Fig. 1, 2).
- On **3 April**, she traveled to two different Western Union locations in Goma and received $1,000 from Aisha Namutebi in London (annex 12, Fig. 2, 3, 5). The same day, she gave $50 to Kaka (Fig. 4), and transferred $200 to "Kig." (Fig. 2, 3). Western Union has no record of a money transfer by Estha Furaha Bulabula from Goma on this day.
- On **4 April**, with no indication she left Goma, she paid $250 to "Ka" (possibly Kaka) (Fig. 3); paid $385 to Bata, an agent for an airline, to transfer a bundle of goods (Fig. 3, 7); and visited Western Union (Fig. 2).
- On **11 April**, she went to Petite Barrière in Goma, at the border with Gisenyi (Fig. 3).
- On **15 April**, she traveled to Western Union in Goma (Fig. 3), where she received $500 from Aisha Namutebi in London (annex 12, Fig. 3). She also traveled to CAS, and noted it was about a plane ticket (Fig. 4).



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7



Figure 8



Figure 9



Figure 10



Figure 11



Figure 12

Annex 15

ADF IED explosive

REPORT OF EXAMINATION

To: [redacted]

Date: June 25, 2014

Case ID No: [redacted]

Lab No: [redacted]

Reference: Communication dated June 11, 2014

Your No: [redacted]

Title: [redacted]

Date specimens received: June 18, 2014

The items listed below were examined at [redacted] Explosives Chemistry.

Q1 Unknown gel sample

Q2 Unknown gel sample

This report contains the results of the explosives chemistry examinations.

Results of Examinations:

Specimens Q1 and Q2 were consistent with slurry a explosive containing ammonium nitrate, guar gum, carbon, monomethylamine nitrate, and microballoons.

The following techniques were used in the analysis of the specimens: visual and [illegible] examinations, infrared spectroscopy, x-ray diffractometry, scanning electron microscopy with energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy, gas chromatography with electron capture detection, gas chromatography gas chromatography with flame ionization detection, ion chromatography, and liquid chromatography mass spectrometry.

The term "consistent with" does not imply an identification of a specific chemical or product. A substance, including explosives, is "consistent with" a material when the analytical data do not support an identification of a specific chemical or product but do provide information to include the substance within a class of materials.

Remarks:

Explosives chemistry examinations are complete. Specimens Q1 and Q2 will be returned to [redacted]. The supporting records for the opinions and interpretations expressed in this report are retained in the [redacted] files. For questions about the contents of this report please contact [redacted]. For questions about the status of your submission, including any remaining forensic examinations, please contact [redacted]

The 25 June 2014 letter above notes that tests of the explosive (by a confidential but certified laboratory) used by ADF and recovered by the Group of Experts is "consistent with slurry a explosive containing ammonium nitrate, guar gum, carbon, monomethylamine nitrate, and microballoons."

Annex 16

Message to FDLR

A joint Congolese/SADC/ICGLR/MONUSCO delegation conveyed the messages in the document below during an August meeting with FDLR, following the ICGLR/SADC extension of the deadline for FDLR's disarmament and surrender. The document notably pointed out deadlines for disarmament and surrender, including the transfer of FDLR to Kisangani starting on 8-9 August, and the departure of all FDLR from DRC by 2 January 2015.

Messages forts à transmettre au leadership des FDLR par la délégation conjointe Gouvernement RDC-SADC-CIRGL-MONUSCO

1. Le transfèrement des éléments FDLR cantonnés à Walungu pour Kisangani via Kavumu devra commencer **le vendredi 8 aout 2014**.

2. Le transfèrement des éléments FDLR cantonnes à Kanyabayonga pour Kisangani via Beni devra commencer **le samedi 9 aout 2014**.

3. Une prochaine cérémonie de désarmement volontaire d'éléments additionnels des FDLR devra intervenir dans la province du Sud-Kivu **le dimanche 10 aout 2014**.

4. Une prochaine cérémonie de désarmement volontaire d'éléments additionnels des FDLR devra intervenir dans la province du Nord-Kivu le **lundi 11 aout 2014**.

5. Si les actions précédentes n'ont pas lieu aux dates respectivement indiquées, le Gouvernement de la RDC, la SADC, la CIRGL et la MONUSCO prendront acte et feront rapport à qui de droit pour la décision conséquente.

Informations à communiquer au leadership des FDLR sur les critères d'évaluation du processus de désarmement volontaire:

1. Tous les FDLR doivent quitter le terntoire de la RDC dans le meilleur délai, et ce délai ne devra pas dépasser 6 mois à partir 2ème juillet 2014, date de la réunion ministérielle conjointe SADC-CIRGL à Luanda.

2. Ce départ des FDLR de la RDC se fera de deux manières:
   a. Soit par rapatriement volontaire au Rwanda conformément au processus DDRRR ;
   b. Soit par relocalisation dans un pays tiers d'accueil situé hors de la sous-région CIRGL.

3. A l'évaluation du processus du désarmement volontaire des FDLR à mi-parcours, soit **le 2 octobre 2014**, il sera pris en compte :
   a. Le nombre de combattants désarmés atteindra au moins 70%;
   b. Le nombre d'armes desarmées atteindra au moins 70%;

4. Les FDLR sont tenus au respect de la configuration de chaque unité qui se desarme: chaîne de commandement, unités d'appui, troupes, armes ;

5. Les FDLR devront cesser immédiatement tous actes de violation des droits de l'homme ;

6. Les FDLR devront cesser immédiatement l'exploitation illicite des ressources naturelles de la RDC et toute autre activité économique illégale.

Kinshasa, le 4 aout 2014.

Annex 17

FDLR cantonment sites

All photos by the Group of Experts on 15 July 2014 (Karhala) and 12 September 2014 (Walungu).

Karhala

Col. Job Munyaneza in front of one of the schools occupied by FDLR combatants and dependents in Karhala.



Inside one of the school buildings.



FDLR combatants

Walungu



Entry gate to the camp in Walungu, guarded by FARDC.

Inside the camp in Walungu

Annex 18

FDLR weapons

Photos taken by the Group of Experts.



Belt receiver of a PKM 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine gun. Photo taken in Mwenga, South Kivu, 5 September 2014.

Front sight and fouled barrel of AK47 7.62x39mm calibre rifle. Photo taken in Goma on 11 September 2014.

Heckler & Koch GmbH (H&K) G3 7.62x51mm calibre rifle. Photo taken in Mwenga on 5 September 2014.

FAL 7.62x51mm calibre rifle rear iron sight. Photo taken in Mwenga on 5 September 2014.

Annex 19

RDU leaders Murayi and Manzi

Downloaded from: http://rdu-rwanda.org/our-leaders.html on 4 October 2014.

About us » Learn about the Presidency

Dr Paulin Murayi President of the RDU

Aloys Manzi Deputy President of the RDU

Our Leaders

President of the RDU

Dr Paulin Murayi

On February 11, 2014, Dr Paulin Murayi was elected the 1st President of the Rwandan Democratic Union. After living his country Rwanda to follow its studies in Belgium ,Dr Paulin Murayi dedicated himself to helping rebuild Rwandan Community in Belgium, a commitment he continued after graduating from Medical studies. He is the co-founder of The Rwandan Democratic Union, and he is inspiring Rwandans to get involved in the political process to establish an equivocal democracy and Justice in Rwanda.

The Vice President of the RDU

Aloys Manzi

Born in Tumba Rulindo District in Rwanda, and lived in France from 1993. Aloys Manzi is the first elected Vice President of the RDU. After achieving its studies in Management and Economics in University of Reims Champagne Ardenne in France and its Business studies in Brighton Business School in the United of Kingdom Aloys Manzi dedicated himself in private sector in same time helping the Rwandan civil society in The United of Kingdom to have voice. He is the co-founder of The United Actions for Peace (UAP). He is member of Hastings Intercultural Organisation (HIO) and He is dedicated to tackle the poverty around the world through Manzi Foundation. Aloys Manzi is also the co-founder of the RDU.

Paulin Murayi explained his problem with RNC in a post on his Facebook "wall", on 4 August 2014, as shown below.

Saved from Paulin Murayi's Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/rwanda.udr, accessed 2 November 2014.

Dr Murayi Paulin
4 August

Le régime de Paul KAGAME continue à utiliser le mensonge et la manipulation pour affaiblir l'opposition et se maintenir au pouvoir.

Je viens de lire un article intitulé : « Kabuga's son-in-law files case aigainst Theogene Rudasingwa in Brussels»
Je voudrais apporter un démenti formel sur le contenu de cet article et attirer l'attention de mes amis de l'opposition mais aussi de la communauté internationale tout entière sur les agissement détestable de ce régime aux aboies.
Je voudrais d'abord commencer par préciser qu'il n' y a pas le moindre litige entre moi-même et le Dr RUDASINGWA. J'ai travaillé avec lui pendant deux ans dans une entente quasi parfaite quand j'étais au RNC. Je ne gère pas la soit distante fortune de Monsieur KABUGA, fortune que le régime actuelle s'est d'ailleurs bien partagée car comme vous le savez il a été dépouillé de tout ses biens au Rwanda et ceux à l'étranger ont été bloqué.
D'aucun comprend que cet article plein de mensonges et d'amalgames n'avait qu'un seul but à savoir, celui de semer la zizanie au sein de l'opposition rwandaise en général et en particulier entre le RNC et la CPC à travers le docteur RUDASINGWA et moi même car ils craignent le rapprochement de nos deux mouvements politiques.
Je voudrais préciser aussi que je n'ai pas quitté le RNC suite à un problème quelconque avec Theogene RUDASINGWA mais bien suite à une mésentente que nous avons eu sur la stratégie à utiliser pour le rassemblement de l'opposition au moment ou les FDLR ont décidé de déposer les armes pour mener, avec le reste de l'opposition, un combat politique. Je reste en contact avec mes amis du RNC et je suis sûr que bientôt nous retravaillerons ensemble pour libérer notre pays de ce régime qui commet les pires des atrocités et qui arrive toujours à s'en sortir par le mensonge et la manipulation.

Annex 20

Press release about Radio Impala

Downloaded from: http://www.fdu-rwanda.com/en/english-rwanda-radio-impala-editorial-and-broadcast-intrusion/ on 27 August 2014.

RWANDA: RADIO IMPALA EDITORIAL AND BROADCAST INTRUSION

March 27, 2014

RWANDA
AMAHORO People s Congress – FDU-INKINGI – Ihuriro RNC

March 25th , 2014

The editorial and Short Wave broadcast of Radio Impala broadcasting on 16 meter band and KHZ 17.540 since November 2013 has been hijacked by third parties and is no longer under the supervision of the association Radio Impala asbl, neither under the management of the platform AMAHORO People's Congress, FDU-INKINGI and RNC. This regrettable situation has been looming since January 1st 2014 and amicable efforts for redress have been exhausted.

It has been confirmed that the short wave station Radio Impala, the website, podcasts, facebook, and other related electronic media are constantly used by either or both Aloys Manzi, Paulin Murayi or Saleh Kanuranga.

We present our apologies to members and friends of our organisations who contributed financially and in many other ways to the creation of this project. We remain very grateful indeed for your continuing efforts, support and dedication.

Our organisations hereby confirm to the listeners of Radio Impala, to the people of the African Great Lakes region , to Rwandans, to all partners of Radio Impala, and to whom it may concern, that we have no responsibility on the current editorial line and the content of the Radio since January 2014.

On behalf of the Association Radio Impala
Sixbert Musangamfura
Editorial board Director

For the platform RNC, FDU-INKINGI and AAMAHORO People s Congress

Dr. Nkiko Nsengimana, Coordinator
FDU-Inkingi
Lausanne, Switzerland

Etienne Masozera, President
AMAHORO People's Congress
Ottawa, Canada

Dr. Theogene Rudasingwa, Coordinator
Rwanda National Congress (RNC)
Washington DC, USA

Annex 21

Murayi's Tanzania visa

Page from Pauling Murayi's passport showing a visa for Tanzania valid 23 March to 23 May 2014. On the visa, an entry stamp for Tanzania is visible, for 23 March 2014.



A stamp from Paulin Murayi's passport showing entry to Tanzania on 30 December 2013.

Annex 22

Money transfers

The following tables are based on data provided to the Group by Western Union.

The table below shows money sent by Hamisi Hasani Kajembe from Tanzania to Marie Furaha, who the Group believes to be the wife of FDLR "Col." Hamada, in Uganda in January-February 2013.

Money sent by Hamisi Hasani Kajembe

Send Date (2014)	Send Location	Recipient	Pay Location	Amount paid (US$)
7 Jan	Dar es Salaam, TZ	Furaha Marie	Kampala, Uganda	187.50
13 Feb	Dar es Salaam, TZ	Furaha Marie	Kampala, Uganda	434.58
28 Feb	Dar es Salaam, TZ	Furaha Marie	Kampala, Uganda	971.65
TOTAL				**$1593.73**

The table below shows money sent by several individuals – including Paulin Murayi – from different locations to Hamisi Hasani Kajembe in Tanzania in January-February 2013. The day after Paulin Murayi sent $1,331 to Hamisi Hasani Kajembe, the receipient sent $972 to Marie Furaha.

Money sent to Hamisi Hasani Kajembe

Send Date (2014)	Send Location	Sender	Pay Location	Amount Paid (US$)
3 Jan	Quebec, Canada	Mbonyinkidi Faustin	Dar es Salaam, Tz	107.25
23 Jan	Mayotte, France	Abdallah Akishuli	Dar es Salaam, TZ	38.71
23 Jan	Maputo, Mozambique	Antoine Hategekimana	Dar es Salaam, TZ	62.36
28 Jan	Quebec, Canada	Mbonyinkidi Faustin	Dar es Salaam, TZ	102.67
13 Feb	Quebec, Canada	Simon Ntibaziyaremye	Dar es Salaam, TZ	160.78
27 Feb	Paris, France	Paulin Murayi	Dar es Salaam, TZ	1,330.87
TOTAL				**$1,802.64**

Annex 23

PNDDR

After the initial massive surrender of 2013, many armed groups still refused to surrender by the end of 2014, among them Yakutumba (para. 106), Mai Mai affiliated to Morgan (para. 116), and NDC.

The DRC government's new program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration called PNDDR III (Programme national de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion) has faced serious challenges. As highlighted in the 2013 final report (S/2014/42, para. 40), the defeat of M23 spurred many Congolese combatants to surrender. However, at the time, there was little preparedness for such surrender. In part due to problems with the plan submitted by Congolese authorities, there were significant delays in donors financing the submitted budget. This meant that regrouping sites (centres de regroupement) for former combatants where inadequately equipped and supplied to take care of combatants (S/2014/42, annex 25). As a result, many former combatants left after waiting for months to be transported to the Kamina, Kitona, and Kotakoli transit camps (centre de transit/CTA).

According to a letter dated 26 June 2014 by General Kahimbi, between March 2014 and 26 June, 924 combatants were held in the regrouping centers of Mubambiro, Beni, Bunia and Walikale, and had been waiting their transfer towards the Kamina and Kitona triage camps (CTA); however, due to delays in transporting these combatants, approximately 216 of them left the regrouping centres. The letter stressed that all centres would run out of food by 5 July. Nonetheless, the DRC government had transported 4,076 combatants eligible for the PNDDR IIII program to the three triage centers. At Kitona, there were 1,265 combatants; at Kamina, 1,022 combatants; and at Kotakoli, 865 combatants. In the case of the triage center in Kotakoli, a remote location in Equateur province, Human Right Watch reported that more than 100 combatants and their dependents died of hunger and diseases; the DRC government confirmed these deaths.

TABLEAU RECAPITULATIF DES EFFECTIFS DES COMBATTANTS DANS DIFFERENTS CENTRES DE REGROUPEMENT

Arrêté à la Date du 26 / 06 /2014

N° SERIE	CENTRE DE REGROUPEMENT (CR)	EFF NORMAL	NON ELIGIBLES NATIONAUX	NON ELIGIBLES ETRANGERS	ENFANTS EFF	OBSERVATION	OBS
01	NYAMUNYUNYI	0	0	0	0	0	
02	MUBAMBIRO	642	144	18	60	150	
03	BENI	104	18	0	12	6	
04	BUNIA	143	25	0	29	51	
05	WALIKALE	35	0	0	3	7	
06	BUNYAKIRI	0	0	0	0	0	
07	KISNADO	0	0	0	0	0	
08	TCHAMBUCHA	0	0	0	0	0	
09	SHABUNDA	0	0	0	0	0	
	TOTAL (A)	924	193	18	112	216	

TABLEAU RECAPITULATIF DES EFFECTIFS DES COMBATTANTS DANS DIFFERENTS CENTRES DE TRANSIT

N° SERIE	CENTRE DE TRANSIT (CTA)					
01	KITONA	1265	X	X	50	X
02	KAMINA	1022	X	X	77	X
03	KOTAKOLI	865	X	X	6	X
	TOTAL (B)	3152	0	0	113	0
	TOTAL GEN	4076	193	18	265	216

KAHIMBI K. Dauphin
Gen Bde
Coord Ops PNDDR

Table showing number of combatants as of 26 June 2014.

Annex 24

RUD

Ralliement pour l'unité et la démocratie

During 2014, the Group interviewed six RUD former combatants. Most of them came to DRC from Uganda before 2014. Four former combatants told the Group about continued recruitment in 2014; only one mentioned children being recruited, while the rest denied the presence of children in RUD.

RUD headquarters remains in Mashuta, North Kivu (S/2014/42, para. 11). The commander of RUD remains "General" Musare and his second in command is "Col." Jean Michel Africa. The head of intelligence service is "Captain" Faida.

Two RUD former combatants told the Group they obtained ammunition from FARDC. One of the former combatants explained to the Group how his commander – "Lt." Claude, commander of Battalion Zirage – sent him three times to buy ammunition from FARDC in North Kivu. The price for one box of AK ammunition was $30; 1 box of machine gun ammunition was $50-$70.

Five of the former combatants talked of the good relations between RUD and FDLR, and the ease of movement in each other's zones of control. Two combatants mentioned meetings taking place between FDLR and RUD in 2014. Three former combatants mentioned the alliance with La Fontaine against Sheka's attacks.

Annex 25

FDLR card

FDLR-FOCA service card belonging to Corporal J. Pierre Gatsinki, from Sanctus unit, and signed by "Col." Israel. Sanctus Unit operates between the zone of Mutaho and Rusayo.

Annex 26

Charcoal and wood trade in Karenga

Bags of charcoal (locally called makala) in Karenga village.



Truck carrying charcoal belonging to an FARDC officer.



People carrying wood to Karenga (above left), and loading the wood onto a truck in Karenga (above right).

Annex 27

Charcoal prices

The information in the table below is based on interviews with four sources in Karenga and Goma. The prices were converted from Congolese francs to US dollars using an exchange of 900 francs = $1. The Group received testimonies that on three days per week (Wednesday, Friday, and Sunday), between 5 and 6 trucks full of charcoal go from Karenga to Goma each day; on other days the traffic is minimal or non-existent. The Group conservatively estimated 14 trucks per week travel from Karenga to Goma, or two per day. The results in the table below therefore represent a minimum for all values.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Trucks per day	Bags per truck	Bags per day (AxB)	Sale price per bag in Karenga (average)	Sale price per day per bag (CxD)	Transport price per truck	Transport price per day (AxF)
2	125	250	$7.22	**$1,805**	$422	$844

H	I	J	K	L	M
Taxes per truck	Taxes per day (AxH)	Price for purchase, transport and tax per day for two trucks (E+G+I)	Sale price per bag in Goma	Sale price per day, total (CxK)	Profit to traders (L-J)
$165	$330	**$2,979**	$24.22	**$6,055**	**$3,076**

The results indicate that the sellers – in this case FARDC and FDLR officers – take in an average of $1,805 per day (column E).

The results also show that charcoal traders more than double their money for each shipment of charcoal from Karenga that they sell in Goma (columns J, L, and M).